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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the manning and maintainability requirements of a 
submarine unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV) program.  This case study reviews current 
commercial and military applications of UUVs and applies their principles to the 
missions of the Navy’s submarine force.  Past and current UUV efforts are lacking 
requirements documents and the formal systems engineering process necessary to 
produce a successful program of record.  Therefore, they are not being funded for use by 
the war-fighter.  The Navy must develop formal concepts of operations (CONOPS) for 
the missions and systems that it wants to produce and allow industry to begin 
development for a formal future UUV program.  Furthermore, the military has developed 
countless unmanned systems that have been developed for use in the water, on the ground 
and in the air, from which the Navy can apply important lessons learned.  Lastly, analysis 
suggests that the Navy should continue to support the use of a submarine detachment for 
operation and maintainability of future vehicle programs.   
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In 2004, the Navy unveiled the Sea Power 21-inspired Unmanned Undersea 
Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan, which defined the nine missions of UUVs and the four 
different vehicle classes that could support those missions.  The Navy has made some 
fundamental changes in their development, testing, and acquisition of UUVs, but even 
with the Master Plan’s recommendations, years later, there is no current submarine UUV 
program of record.  This thesis utilized government and industry resources to focus on 
the systems engineering fundamentals that are necessary to have a successful submarine 
UUV program in the near future.  Moreover, the intent of this thesis was to research past 
and current programs and missions and provide recommendations for the manning and 
maintainability aspects of the systems engineering lifecycle.  To do this, the research 
started with the large-scale concept of UUVs and eventually focused on the manning and 
maintainability aspects that are specifically related to UUVs in support of submarine 
missions. 
The purpose of this thesis was to provide recommendations for the steps 
necessary to have a successful submarine UUV program of record.  Additionally, the 
thesis discusses the impact that unmanned undersea vehicles will have on the submarine 
force, focusing on the two key areas of manning and maintainability.  In doing this 
research, assumptions have been made that the technological challenges of deploying 
UUVs from, or in tandem with, submarines are ones that will be possible to overcome.  
Lastly, this thesis was completed as an UNCLASSIFIED document.  Though some of the 
research did involve classified discussions, presentations, and documents, they were not 
used in any capacity for the final write-up.  As a result, some systems, technologies, 
missions, and information have been presented in a focus different or separated from 
doctrine discussed directly by the United States Navy.   
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B. UTILIZING UUVS TO SUPPORT SUBMARINE MISSIONS 
UUVs are not a new concept.  The necessary technologies exist and members of 
industry and military have been using forms of UUVs for many years.  This does not 
mean, however, that UUVs are ready to perform all missions required of their military 
stakeholders.  UUV missions lack importance unless there is a clear benefit to be gained 
from their deployment.  Three high level advantages of unmanned systems in the 
maritime domain are that they can decrease cost, increase capability, and reduce risk.   
The two major factors that contribute to the various types of UUVs are size and 
complexity.  UUVs are broken into four classes, based on their displacements.  For the 
intent of a submarine program, the two larger classes (as defined by the 2004 UUV 
Master Plan) of Heavy Weight Vehicle (HWV) (21-inch diameter and less than 3000 
pounds of displacement) and Large Vehicle (greater than 26-inch diameter and 
approximately 20,000 pounds of displacement) are considered.  Additionally, unmanned 
system complexity is a factor of the level of autonomy, which can range between human-
operated and fully autonomous.  Ideally, a UUV program would utilize a fully 
autonomous vehicle, but this is one of the technical challenges currently faced by the 
Navy and the industrial developers.  Though the technology does exist, it requires the 
confidence of the operator moving forward.   
Future naval battles will rely heavily on advantages gained through the 
combination of strategies, tactics, procedures, and technologies called network-centric 
warfare and implemented through the strategy of ForceNet.  These ideas rely heavily on 
Joint Force assets working together with common communication nodes.  Large-scale 
undersea networks, like those adhering to ForceNet will be used heavily in the future of 
undersea warfare (USW), with UUVs acting as crucial communication nodes to and from 
submarine and surface assets.  Out of the nine key mission areas discussed in the 2004 
UUV Master Plan, three specific missions should be considered for a near-term 
submarine UUV program and can be evaluated as part of the overall ForceNet image.  
These missions are: 
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• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).  There are four 
fundamental tasks necessary to complete an ISR mission: collect, 
communicate, process, and act.  Due to the simplistic nature and emerging 
technologies, the submarine ISR mission-set will see the first full scale use 
of UUVs. 
• Communications.  Communication is an important aspect for all military 
operations.  Underwater communications are complex and pose many 
problems in the area of USW.  One technology is to utilize digital acoustic 
communications in modem-like bursts to communicate between a 
submarine and a network of UUVs acting as communication nodes.  There 
are multiple programs being worked on by industry that make use of this 
theory and have the ability to perform the desired missions. 
• Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW).  Submarines have always played a 
vital role in ASW.  The force multiplication factor added by UUVs will 
allows them to constantly patrol and monitor areas of interest.  UUVs and 
friendly submarines could remain in constant communication, relaying 
valuable mission and classification data, which would drastically increase 
the overall effectiveness of current ASW tactics.   
Though there have been past programs, and current projects, that focus on the 
levels of complexity, two vehicle sizes, and three missions discussed, there is no current 
UUV program of record relating to submarine operations.  The extinct programs and 
current projects lend themselves to lessons learned for future success.  The submarine 
UUV programs that have failed can be attributed to lack of requirements and improper 
system development.  Each of these programs, however, has given the Navy valuable 
insight on the manning and maintainability requirements of future UUV programs. 
The biggest technical challenges faced by past programs have been the interaction 
between the submarine and UUV.  Possible submarine-UUV interactions include: 
• Launch and Recovery.  The ability to launch and recover a UUV from a 
submarine is the greatest technical challenge that has led to the failure of 
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at least two programs [Long-term mine reconnaissance system (LMRS) 
and mission reconfigurable UUV (MRUUV)].  Emerging technologies are 
coming close to making this mission possible, but both physical space and 
maintenance routines are still a challenge on board a submarine. 
• Launch without Recovery.  Setting up a scenario with UUV system 
launch via a torpedo tube, missile tube, or dry-deck shelter will allow for 
covert deployment of one or more UUVs while avoiding the drawbacks 
associated with space considerations to support organizational level 
maintenance and technical risks of torpedo tube recovery.  Upon mission 
completion, the UUV could either be abandoned or recovered by use of a 
support ship. 
• Non-physical Interactions.  Regardless of the form of deployment, there 
are several possible non-physical interactions between the submarine and 
UUV, including: mission control, consumer/interrogator of data, and 
docking station delivery.  Each of these interactions hold true for all forms 
of UUV launch and recovery.  Designing UUV and submarine interactions 
independent of the launch source will help transition to a less “platform 
centric” design of UUV systems.  When systems can be designed without 
the platform in mind, there is more room for growth and an increased 
chance of long-term success for a program. 
Additionally, Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) and Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) have been in use longer than UUVs.  This longevity provides the UGVs 
and UAVs with valuable lessons learned that can be applied to their undersea 
counterparts.  This thesis discusses eleven lessons learned that can apply to the manning 
and maintainability practices.  These lessons are: 
• Uncertainty promotes survival 
• Simpler solutions provide better foundations  
• Many simple cooperating agents are superior to one complex agent 
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• Maintenance should be done at the user level 
• System requirements should be clear up front 
• Acquire reliability data throughout all stages of development 
• Structure a process for sharing data 
• Limit the number of design configurations 
• Consider supportability up front 
• Endurance has its benefits 
• Minimize the levels of redundancy 
C. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING OF A SUBMARINE UUV PROGRAM 
There are four fundamental stages to system design lifecycle.  This four-stage 
process has analysis, verification, and feedback occurring simultaneously with each step.  
All four stages are required for a program to be “Systems Engineered” correctly.  To 
successfully complete a mission or set of missions, the four stages of the process need to 
occur in the following order: 
• Develop Requirements, based on missions 
• Determine Tasks, based on requirements 
• Create Functions, based on tasks 
• Design Components, based on functions 
Proper requirement definitions are produced with the system stakeholders and are derived 
from the mission requirements.  Unfortunately, this stage is often not understood by the 
customer and requires the attention of a formally trained Systems Engineer.  Many 
engineers feel the role of the systems engineering process begins at the requirements 
document, when in fact the Systems Engineer should work directly with the stakeholder 
to understand the requirements and eventually formalize those requirements.  Current 
Navy submarine UUV projects have shown success in various at sea tests, but are not part 
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of a formal program and have included unclear, if not completely undefined, 
requirements.  This shortfall has meant that even though the programs may have 
performed up to the operator’s expectations, the funding line is not in place for future 
development of the systems and, as a result, may leave them forever sidelined. 
Feedback should not only be done internal to the system, but must be used from 
similar programs to gather valuable data necessary to maximize the probability of 
successfully engineering a new complex system.  Lack of feedback has caused past UUV 
programs, with clearly stated requirements, to develop to a certain level and then become 
cancelled by the Navy, for there to be a new programs started from the beginning. 
Ideally, it is not only important that a program has requirements, but it will also need to 
take lessons learned from previous similar programs. 
In the systems lifecycle, there are three different stages of design: conceptual, 
preliminary, and detail.  This incremental process allows the inter-stage feedback to 
provide real time response and allows for flexibility in the growth of the design process.  
Future submarine UUV systems should account for manning and maintainability during 
the developmental stages of the systems engineering lifecycle. 
Sample concepts of operations (CONOPS) were created to offer suggestions for 
the specific types of missions the Navy should pursue for a submarine UUV program and 
the manning and maintainability suggestions that would apply to these missions.  The two 
discussed CONOPS were: 
• Group of Submarine Launched UUVs.  Small, torpedo tube-launched 
UUVs would be ideal to complete an ISR mission.  Several of these UUVs 
would be launched from a submerged submarine and would transition into 
an area of interest.  The lead UUV would surface and extend a mast to 
collect intelligence data.  The other UUVs would act as communication 
nodes and relay the information to be analyzed onboard back to the 
submarine.  This mission would require a cadre of five individuals aboard 
the submarine operating the systems and performing minimal 
organizational level maintenance during the deployment. 
 xix
• Group of Large Diameter UUVs (LDUUVs).  LDUUVs could be 
launched from a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to complete a harbor 
monitoring and tracking ASW mission.  Multiple LDUUVs would be 
launched and recovered from the LCS, while the submarine would remain 
near the operational area and communicate with the LDUUVs, relaying 
critical mission data.  This scenario would require a small group of 
operators on the submarine and a mix of ten Navy personnel and 
contractors on board the LCS.  This scenario supports longer missions and 
would require that extensive maintenance be performed on board the LCS. 
These CONOPS do not provide all of the solutions of decision makers, but rather gives 
them a stepping point for future submarine UUV program development. 
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The government is devoting much effort in the formal training and proper use of 
Systems Engineers.  As a result, many programs are seeing an increase in their 
productivity during the early stages of lifecycle development.  Unfortunately, many 
programs are being researched and tested using informal processes through government 
organizations like ONR and DARPA and are ultimately cancelled due to funding 
concerns.  Though there is a place for research and development of technologies, the 
current procedures are sidelining UUV programs that have performed up to, and in some 
cases beyond, operator’s expectations.  Many programs in development are outside the 
needs of preliminary development and must be pursued in the form of a formal program.  
To ensure a successful program, the systems will need to be developed using a formal 
systems engineering process.  Adhering to these processes will ensure that a successful 
program will retain funding. 
To do this, the Navy must start with a clearly defined mission and then follow 
four basic systems engineering steps to develop the ideas into systems.  This will require 
the government to produce ideas independent of the end product in mind.  The intent of 
the thesis was to analyze the impact of a submarine UUV program on the manning and  
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maintenance of the submarine force.  Outside of the systems engineering and 
development process concerns discussed previously, this thesis comes to three 
conclusions:  
• Focus the Missions.  This study shows that the Navy should only focus on 
three short-term missions for a submarine UUV program: ISR, 
communications, and ASW.  These missions were chosen based on 
operator demands, and are the missions that are most easily accomplished 
with the current technologies available.  The challenges (other than 
budgetary ones) that face current ISR and ASW missions are longevity, 
and launch and recovery.  This research suggested ways of creating 
programs that will gain successful mission results in the near-term, while 
still adhering to the technical constraints faced by UUV developers.  One 
example includes the use of multiple vehicles to complete the same 
mission as a single long endurance vehicle. 
• Learn Lessons from UGVs and UAVs.  UGVs and UAVs provide 
several similarities to UUVs and were the basis for the eleven lessons 
learned pertaining to the development of UUV systems.  The eleven 
lessons were diverse in their relation to UUVs, but all provided ideas that 
should be considered during the front-end system development process 
that directly relate to the manning and maintainability of a program of 
record.  These lessons (along with any others shared amongst the program 
offices) should all be considered prior to spending more money on testing, 
developing, and fielding new unmanned systems. 
• Consider Manning and Maintainability.  The original intent of the 
research was to understand the manning and maintenance models and 
concerns that UUVs would have on the submarine force. Past systems 
have neglected the impact of logistics on the deployment of new systems, 
and it is important that the developers of a submarine UUV program do 
not forget this.  The limited size, space, and crew aboard a SSN will 
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require these thoughts to be fully considered before the program enters the 
advanced development stages.  Analysis suggests that operators should 
continue to be part of a cadre of submarine qualified sailors with diverse 
ratings.  These operators must be qualified to both operate and maintain 
the systems at both the organizational and intermediate maintenance 
levels. 
The intent of this thesis was to focus on the abstract, high-level concepts that will 
effect the manning and maintainability aspects of the systems engineering process.  As a 
result, the scope of this thesis has led to several areas of further research for future 
studies.  The future work to expand this thesis into real world applications should be done 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
In 2004, the Navy unveiled the Sea Power 21-inspired Unmanned Undersea 
Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan, which defined nine missions of UUVs and four different 
vehicle classes that could support those missions.  On top of the generic missions and 
vehicles, the new Master Plan defined six key recommendations for moving forward 
(Department of the Navy, 2004): 
1. Develop four UUV classes: Man Portable (<100 pounds), Light Weight 
(~500 pounds), Heavy Weight (~3000 pounds), and Large (~20,000 
pounds) 
2. Develop standards and implement modularity 
3. Establish a balanced UUV technology program 
4. Increase experimentation in UUV technology 
5. Coordinate with other unmanned vehicle programs 
6. Field systems in the fleet 
The Navy has made some fundamental changes in their development, testing, and 
acquisition of UUVs, but even with these recommendations, years later, there is no 
current submarine UUV program of record.  This thesis utilized government and industry 
resources to focus on the systems engineering fundamentals that are necessary to have a 
successful submarine UUV program in the near future.  Moreover, the intent of this thesis 
was to research past and current programs and missions and provide recommendations 
for the manning and maintainability aspects of the systems engineering lifecycle.  To do 
this, the research started with the large-scale concept of UUVs and eventually focused on 
the manning and maintainability aspects that are specifically related to UUVs in support 
of submarine missions. 
The analysis began with generic UUV missions and systems used by both 
industry and military entities.  After the discussion of generic use of UUVs, the next 
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focus is on submarine missions that can be supported by UUVs, and which of past and 
present Navy programs can support those missions.  Next, eleven lessons learned from 
unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are introduced 
and discussed. 
The main focus of the thesis was a systems engineering discussion with extra 
emphasis put into the manning and maintainability stages of the systems engineering 
lifecycle, and the impacts these stages will have on the submarine fleet after UUV 
implementation.  This discussion leads into the introduction of two sample concepts of 
operations (CONOPS) that integrate all aspects of research of the thesis.  The purposes of 
the CONOPS are to lay out recommendations for the Navy as they move forward in 
development of a formal UUV program.   
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis was to provide recommendations for the steps 
necessary to have a successful submarine UUV program of record.  Additionally, the 
thesis discusses the impact that unmanned undersea vehicles will have on the submarine 
force, focusing on the two key areas of manning and maintainability.  In doing this 
research, assumptions have been made that the technological challenges of deploying 
UUVs from, or in tandem with, submarines are challenges that the Navy can overcome. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis addresses the following research questions as a means of research and 
direction for the thesis. 
1. Which UUV missions are most likely to occur in the near future?  Are 
these missions feasible for the Navy? 
2. Which of the UUV missions are most applicable to support the submarine 
force?  Will these missions require deployment/retrieval from a submarine 
platform? 
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3. Have unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) provided any lessons learned during their employment in military 
operations?  
4. Will UUVs have a detachment to support their use, or will they utilize 
ship’s force?  Will the operators be contractors or military?  If military, 
which ratings will be used to operate these systems?  Will additional 
ratings be necessary to accommodate the mission sets?  What training is 
necessary for the operators? 
5. What changes in the current infrastructure for maintenance and system 
support are necessary to complete the missions of both the UUVs and 
submarines?  Can the maintenance be done on board (operator level), or 
will other vessels and facilities be required?  Does the use of UUVs 
change the original schedule of the host submarine? 
D. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
This thesis begins the valuable systems engineering necessary to develop and 
deploy UUVs for use by the submarine force.  Additionally, the collaborative nature of 
this thesis aids in breaking down the “stove-pipe” system currently in place for UUV 
development.   
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
It is important to note that this thesis is UNCLASSIFIED.  Though some of the 
research did involve classified discussions, presentations, and documents, they were not 
used in any capacity for the final write-up.  As a result, some systems, technologies, 
missions, and information have been presented in a focus different or separate from 
doctrine discussed directly by the United States Navy (USN).  These differences are 
understood, but bear little relevance to the overall conclusions and recommendations 
cited by this work. 
This scope of research was limited to only unmanned undersea vehicles and their 
impact on the submarine fleet.  Though it takes lessons learned from UAVs and UGVs, it 
 4
will neglect the impact of these systems and the collaborative effort they can bring to the 
Navy.  Similarly, other vessels and missions may take advantage of UUVs in the Navy 
but the research focused specifically on UUVs designed to aid with submarine missions.  
The only non-submarine platforms that were researched were vessels that may be 
necessary for system support or deployment [i.e., Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) or 
submarine tenders]. 
The research began by attending conferences relevant to UUVs.  These 
conferences, hosted by the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) and the 
American Society of Naval Engineers (ASNE) had the dual benefit of providing useful 
information about UUV systems and created networking amongst the author and 
Department of Defense (DoD) and industry contacts.  After generating a list of useful 
contacts after each conference, the author framed questions specific to their expertise and 
conducted interviews via email, phone, and in person. 
This information helped focus efforts toward the manning and maintainability 
aspects of UUV operations and generated the needs and constraints faced by the 
stakeholders of the future UUV systems.  The interviews were followed by researching 
current UUV systems (which lead to more interviews) and exploring previous impacts of 
both UGVs and UAVs on their operators and maintainers.  This data was analyzed and 
coupled together to reach the conclusions and recommendations of this thesis and to 
provide areas for additional investigations. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the background, purpose, research questions, benefit of 
study, and scope and methodology that has gone into the development of the thesis.  The 
content of this section provided the focus areas necessary to direct the thesis research. 
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II. UUV MISSIONS AND SYSTEMS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
UUVs are not a new concept.  The necessary technologies exist and members of 
industry and military have been using forms of UUVs for many years.  For example, a 
torpedo is a type of UUV.  This does not mean, however, that UUVs are ready to perform 
all missions required by their military stakeholders.  This chapter will outline various 
UUV missions for the Navy and introduces various industry vehicles that support similar 
operations.  It is not the intent of this chapter to directly link military missions to specific 
brands of UUVs. 
B. UUV MISSIONS 
1. Advantages of UUVs for Military Operations 
UUV missions lack importance unless there is a clear benefit to be gained from 
their deployment.  To address this, dozens of unique advantages of UUVs could be listed; 
instead, the list was refined to three distinct advantages of using unmanned systems in the 
maritime domain. The three high level advantages of unmanned systems are decreased 
cost, increased capability, and reduced risk.   
a. Decreased Cost 
Properly distributing UUVs will greatly reduce the cost of patrolling the 
vast oceans (Heatley, Horner, & Kragelund, 2005).  Though the individual systems may 
cost between several hundred thousand and a few million dollars, they are much cheaper 
than the SSN equivalent of over two billion dollars.  Additionally, as will be discussed in 
the systems engineering chapter, the manning and maintainability requirements for 
individual UUVs have the ability drastically reduce the lifecycle costs (LCC) of 
unmanned versus manned systems.  This thesis does not evaluate a full cost benefit 
analysis (CBA) of UUVs; even without this analysis it immediately is evident the cost 
savings these systems provide to the military. 
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b. Increased Capability 
Though cost is an initial driver for implementing unmanned systems, this 
cost reduction will not happen overnight.  Initial UUV deployments will actually result in 
an increase in cost (and manning), since the Navy will continue to deploy manned 
systems in conjunction with the new unmanned systems.  What the Navy will gain, 
however, is an increased capability of the systems that take advantage of UUVs.  Upon 
achieving “steady state,” it is projected that UUVs will increase capability and reduce 
manning and decrease cost. 
The missions provided by UUVs are not new to the Navy, but the 
situations in which these missions can be accomplished are the capabilities the UUVs 
provide.  Amongst the capabilities is the access to unique environments provided by their 
smaller, less detectable size, in comparison to manned systems.  This versatility provides 
an increased benefit in several mission sets in the littoral waterways, including mine 
detection, payload delivery, and intelligence gathering.  Another capability, often utilized 
in UAVs, is collaborative networking.  A group of UUVs can fuse sensor data and 
provide communication nodes back to the manned host platform, increasing the 
effectiveness of specific undersea mission areas (Fraser, 2009). 
c. Reduced Risk 
Unmanned systems remove the operators from the hazardous 
environments in which they operate, instantly creating a safer environment for the war-
fighters.  Eliminating the manned portion of these missions will additionally reduce risk 
by allowing the operator to focus on mission planning, situation and knowledge 
management, and decision making (Fraser, 2009).   
2. UUV Sub-Pillar Missions 
The 2004 UUV Master Plan outlines nine essential missions that can be linked to 
UUVs, called “sub-pillars.”  These sub-pillars, in “priority” order, are (Department of the 
Navy, 2004): 
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1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
2. Mine Countermeasures (MCM) 
3. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
4. Inspection / Identification (ID) 
5. Oceanography 
6. Communication / Navigation Network Nodes (CN3) 
7. Payload Delivery 
8. Information Operations (IO) 
9. Time Critical Strike (TCS) 
a. Vision of Sea Power 21 
In a 2002 article in Proceedings Magazine, the then Chief of Naval 
Operations Admiral Vern Clark outlined his vision for how the future Navy will organize, 
integrate, and transform itself to the 21st century.  He called his new vision “Sea Power 
21.”  Sea Power 21 consists of three fundamental concepts of naval operational 
effectiveness: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.  Each of these capabilities was 
constructed around the main concept of ForceNet which is the “operational construct and 
architectural framework … integrating warriors, sensors, command and control, 




Figure 1. Initial vision of Sea Power 21 (From: Clark, 2002) 
 
 
b. Relating Sea Power 21 to Nine Sub-Pillars 
UUVs provide a key component to the vision of Sea Power 21, utilizing 
the UUV advantages of reducing risk and increasing capabilities through force 
multiplication.  The nine sub-pillars can be grouped into categories relating directly to the 
four segments of Sea Power 21, shown in Table 1.  The missions that specifically relate 
to submarine related missions will be further detailed in the next chapter. 
 
 
Table 1. Mapping of the nine sub-pillars to Sea Power 21 vision (After: 
Department of the Navy, 2004) 














C. UUV SYSTEMS 
The number of missions that can be supported by UUVs is endless.  This section 
will discuss the four vehicle classes defined by the 2004 Navy UUV Master Plan and list 
some of the many vehicles that have been developed for commercial and military use. 
1. UUV Vehicle Classes 
There are four vehicle classes for UUVs as defined by the 2004 Navy UUV 
Master Plan.  These classes are 1) Man-Portable, 2) Light Weight Vehicle (LWV), 3) 
Heavy Weight Vehicle (HWV), and 4) Large Vehicle, as characterized in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Definition of UUV classes for nominal levels of performance (After: 













Man-Portable 3 – 9 < 100 < 10 10 – 20 < 0.25 
LWV 12.75 ~ 500 10 – 20 20 – 40 1 – 3 
HWV 21 < 3000 20 – 50 40 – 80 4 – 6 
Large > 36 ~ 20,000 100 – 300 >> 400 15 – 30 
 
The vehicle class diversity allows for flexibility in vehicles for meeting the nine 
UUV sub-pillar capabilities outlined in the 2004 Master Plan.  Each class and sub-pillar 
has several different specific missions that can be accomplished, and Table 3 links some 
of the generic missions of each sub-pillar to its applicable vehicle class. 
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Table 3. Classes of UUVs mapped to generic missions of the nine sub-pillars 
(After: Department of the Navy, 2004) 
Mission Man-Portable LMV HWV Large 
ISR Special Purpose Harbor Tactical Persistent 







ASW    Hold at Risk 
Inspection/ID HLD / Force 
Protection 
   
Oceanography  Special Purpose Littoral Access Long Range 
CN3 VSW / SOF Mobile CN3   
Payload 
Delivery 
   SOF, ASW, 
MCM, TCS 
IO  Network Attack Submarine 
Decoy 
 
TCS    SOF, ASW, 
MCM, TCS 
 
2. Sample UUV Platforms 
It is important from an economic standpoint to combine, wherever possible, 
commercial and military development of UUVs.  This concept was researched by an 
NDIA Undersea Warfare (USW) division working group for PMS 403 in a 2004 study 
entitled “Open Architecture, Dual Commercial/Military Use of Large Displacement 
Unmanned Undersea Vehicles.”  This study drew a main conclusion of the limitations of 
21-inch HWVs from an energy storage and payload perspective.  The study suggested 
that large UUVs increase the operational capabilities needed by the future Navy, and 
focused on various ways of deploying such systems from host platforms (to be discussed 
in further detail in the next chapter).  In order to be able to afford these large UUVs, the 
Navy cannot be the only stakeholder.  Though, at the time of the study, there was no clear 
demand for large UUVs in the private sector, NDIA researchers suggested that 
Government partnerships and incentives may create a future demand (National Defense 
Industrial Association, 2004). 
This study confirms the desire of the Navy to use commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) systems for future UUV needs.  The use of COTS systems will require today’s 
UUVs to be upgraded to military standards prior to Navy use.  Though this may not be an 
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easy task, current industry vehicles used by private firms and/or developed by research 
institutes can provide a baseline for the technology and capabilities that will be seen in 
the Navy’s future UUVs.  Some of the many potential COTS vehicles are introduced in 
the following pages and related to the UUVs discussed in later parts of this thesis.  The 
vehicles featured in Table 4 were selected due to the diverse nature with respect to each 
other. 
 
Table 4. Summary of sample UUVs analyzed 
Name Length Diameter Max Depth Endurance 
REMUS-100 63 inches 7.5 inches 400 feet 8 hours @ 5 knots 
Bluefin-21  130 inches 21 inches 600 feet 18 hours @ 3 knots 
ASM-X 20 feet 21 inches Unknown 30 hours @ 2 knots 
HUGIN 3000  17 feet 3.3 feet 10000 feet 50 hours @ 4 knots 
Slocum Glider 5 feet 8.5 inches 3000 feet > 30 days 
 
a. REMUS-100, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute 
Remote Environmental Monitoring Units (REMUS) is a man-portable 
vehicle created by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute (WHOI) and is one of the 
smallest UUVs operated by the Navy.  The small size of the system allows for single 
operator deployment without the need of a sophisticated (or expensive) launch and 
recovery apparatus.  One current military application of the REMUS-100 is MCM 
operations by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) community.  A user evaluation 
was conducted as part of their procurement strategy for Program Executive Office 
Littoral Mine Warfare (PEO LMW) from 2001 – 2003, uncovering important lessons 
learned and operational capabilities explicit for very shallow water (VSW) MCM.  
Logging over 250 hours in 150 missions, the EOD team’s UUV Platoon was able to gain 
confidence in the equipment and confirmed operational suitability prior to deploying the 




Figure 2. REMUS 100 vehicle in use by the Navy EOD community in  
VSW MCM testing (From: Clegg & Peterson, 2003) 
 
b. Bluefin-21, Bluefin Robotics 
Designs of military applications of UUVs are often focused toward those 
with 21-inch diameters. This size is the same as a mark-48 torpedo and can often be 
visualized best by the future UUV operators, as well as has an immediate benefit of being 
able to be launched and recovered from a torpedo tube (though technologically this feat is 
much more difficult than the average sailor would assume).  The main appeal of the 21-
inch diameter UUV, however, is in regard to its logistics.  The handling and maintenance 
of this size of vessel is well understood and has been in practice for several years, which 
has made it very common for both industry and military applications.  One example is the 
Bluefin Robotics Bluefin-21 Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) and the military 
follow-on of the Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (BPAUV).  
The original Bluefin-21 design consists of modular variable length payload design on a 
common hull and was based on the Atlantic Layer Tracking Experiment AUV, which 
was used in seafloor surveys throughout the Arctic basin (Bellingham, et al., 2000).  The 
systems have a unique feature of battery modules which allow for quick (<2 hour) 
turnaround deck time between its 18-hour deployments.  When the BPAUV was 
produced for Fleet Battle Exercises, the modular design was replaced with common 
payloads necessary for bathymetry and bottom classification in battlespace preparation 




Figure 3. Schematic of Bluefin-21 BPAUV (From: Bluefin Robotics, 2009) 
 
c. ASM-X, DCNS 
A militarized similarity to the Bluefin-21 BPAUV is the ASM-X.  
Developed by the French defense contractor DCNS, the ASM-X has been designed with 
F21 torpedo requirements, allowing the UUV to be launched and recovered from 
submarine torpedo tubes.  Once deployed, it increases the operational capability of 
submarines by covertly gathering and transmitting real time intelligence information 
collected during its patrol.  The modular design of the vessel allows for ease of 
maintenance and dynamic performance by swapping onboard payloads (DCNS, 2010). 
 
 




d. HUGIN 3000 AUV, Kongsberg 
Because of their ability to endure, the Navy has been driving away from 
the smaller displacement UUVs and into the realm of the HWV and Large classes.  The 
HUGIN 3000, developed in Norway, is a proven commercial UUV that is being 
militarized for various European navies.  A large-scale vessel such as this gives the Navy 
the ability to reach deep seas (up to 10,000 feet) in a reliable, covert fashion.   In order to 
be successful for USN operations, the vessel would have to be modified to military 
specifications.  The team at C&C technologies, who currently use various HUGIN 
vessels for commercial mapping, believes that a militarized variant of the HUGIN 3000 
would be ideal for the variety of missions being pursued by the Navy, including 
surveillance, mine reconnaissance, and weapons delivery (Kleiner, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 5. HUGIN 3000 shown on the recovery platform (From: Kleiner, 2004) 
 
e. Slocum Glider, Webb Research Corporation 
Propeller-less glider technology varies from traditional UUV technology.  
Often referred to as underwater flight, gliders rely on varying vehicle buoyancy for 
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forward motion, constantly propelling forward while maintaining a “saw-tooth” depth 
pattern.  This motion decreases the accuracy of the vessel movements, but increases the 
endurance drastically.  Additionally, during each periodic surface the glider is able to 
communicate mission data and obtain navigation coordinates via the global positioning 
system.  Payloads can be varied in gliders, but current systems do not focus on military 
operations and consist of conductivity, temperature, and depth sensors.  An overall 
CONOPS graphic showing the vehicle motion and communication can be found in Figure 
6 (Teledyne Webb Research, 2010). 
Slocum gliders, produced by Webb Research, have two different designs, 
electric and thermal.  The electric gliders use alkaline batteries to change buoyancy and 
have ranges up to 1500 km and endurance of around 30 days; thermal gilders use a 
thermal engine making the range over 40,000 km and theoretical endurances of five years 
(Teledyne Webb Research, 2010).  Naval applications would most likely push toward the 
electric technologies, but in either case, gliders produce the endurance benefits the Navy 
desires while keeping size, maintenance requirements, and operating costs low. 
 
 
Figure 6. Slocum electric glider high-level mission CONOPS (From: Teledyne 
Webb Research, 2010) 
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3. Levels of Autonomy 
There are six levels of autonomy in a vehicle, as defined by the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicles Program (National Research Council, 
2000): 
• Fully autonomous.  The system requires no human intervention to 
perform any of the designed activities across all planned ranges of 
environmental conditions. 
• Mixed initiative.  Both the human and the system can initiate behaviors 
based on sensed data. The system can coordinate its behavior with the 
human’s behaviors both explicitly and implicitly.  The human can 
understand the behaviors of the system in the same way that he or she 
understands his or her own behaviors.  A variety of means is provided to 
regulate the authority of the system with respect to human operators. 
• Human-supervised.  The system can perform a wide variety of activities 
once given top-level permissions or direction by a human.  The system 
provides sufficient insight into its internal operations and behaviors that it 
can be understood by its human supervisor and be appropriately 
redirected. The system cannot self-initiate behaviors that are not within the 
scope of its current directed tasks. 
• Human-delegated.  The system can perform limited control activity on a 
delegated basis. This level encompasses automatic flight controls, engine 
controls, and other low-level automation that must be activated or 
deactivated by a human and act in mutual exclusion with human operation. 
• Human-assisted.  The system can perform activities in parallel with 
human input, thereby augmenting the ability of the human to perform the 
desired activities. However, the system has no ability to act without 
accompanying human input. 
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• Human-operated.  All activity within the system is the direct result of 
human-initiated control inputs. The system has no autonomous control of 
its environment, although it may be capable of information-only responses 
to sensed data. 
Complications with undersea communications and sight make human-operated, 
human-assisted, and human-delegated operations of a UUV to have extremely limited 
capabilities.  Human-supervised and mixed initiative control is possible through a 
tethered undersea vehicle, but is outside of the scope of this thesis. This means that, 
ideally, a UUV program would utilize a fully autonomous vehicle, but this is one of the 
technical challenges currently faced by the Navy and the industrial developers.  Though 
the technology does exist, it requires the confidence of the operator moving forward.  
This thesis will assume that the UUV systems discussed will have the ability to operate 
under a fully autonomous mode.  This distinction is often made by using the phrase 
AUV, opposed to a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV), but will apply to the phrase UUV 
throughout this thesis. 
In an unmanned system, an increase in the mission autonomy will cause an 
increase in the amount of system complexity.  The relationship between the two is shown 
in Figure 7, where “Mission autonomy” is a factor both of mission complexity and the 
degree of autonomy, placed on a generic scale between 1 and 10. (National Research 




Figure 7. Relationship between mission autonomy and system complexity for 
unmanned systems (From: National Research Council, 2005) 
 
With advances in technology, it is possible in the long run to see a leveling out of 
the system complexity with an increase of mission autonomy.  This can be noticed in the 
figure above by the lessened degree of complexity for UUVs compared to UAVs.  This 
reduction in system complexity can be attributed to the higher degrees of autonomy in 
UUVs with fewer communications (which are relatively complex) between the platform 
and the host vessel / operator (National Research Council, 2005).  Additionally, there is a 
sizeable decrease in the complexity of balance and control in an undersea platform 
travelling at less than ten knots versus a flying platform travelling at several hundred 
knots. 
These facts are helpful to understand when a Systems Engineer uses the level of 
mission autonomy (and thus system complexity) as a design choice.  System design is an 
iterative evaluation of requirements and CONOPS given a varying set of design inputs.  
In the case of an unmanned vehicle, the degree of autonomy capability is a direct input to 
the design of the command-and-control system (C2S), mission management system 
(MMS), and vehicle management system (VMS), shown in Figure 8 (National Research 
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Council, 2005).  The autonomy, subsystem, and vehicle capabilities should be equally 
traded to maximize the overall mission and system capability, as determined by the 
Systems Engineer (in the case of Figure 8 it is determined in the example shown by 
mission effectiveness, vehicle survivability, and system affordability). 
 
 
Figure 8. A trade-off study methodology incorporating level of mission autonomy 
as a design choice (From: National Research Council, 2005) 
 
A successful UUV system must be designed with high levels of autonomy, and 
therefore with large degrees of complexity.  Though this topic is not discussed in great 
detail in this thesis, this and other trade studies must be fully completed when creating a 
successful submarine UUV program.  A further discussion of trade studies appears in 
Chapter V. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the 2004 Navy UUV Master Plan and cited the nine sub-
pillar missions, vision of Sea Power 21, and the four vehicle classes.  Various industry 
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UUVs were introduced to set a foundation for the types of systems and capabilities that 
will be possible for use by the military.   The COTS systems cited in this chapter will be 
revisited during the Systems Engineering chapter.  Little discussion in this thesis will 
focus on the levels of autonomy beyond the short discussion in this chapter, and all 
systems will be assumed to operate in a fully autonomous mode. 
The sample UUV platforms are not intended to provide any recommendations for 
specific vehicles or imply that these vehicles adhere to military standards.  The next 
chapter will focus on which missions and vehicles are most applicable for use by the 
submarine force. 
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III. UUVS IN SUPPORT OF SUBMARINE MISSIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The ability to perform missions undetected and maintain global dominance 
through threat deterrence makes submarines a vital asset to the Navy’s Fleet.  As UUVs 
become more popular for use by the DoD, it only makes sense to combine their missions 
with the missions currently completed by submarines.  The construction of the Virginia 
Class submarines, and the conversion of the SSBNs to SSGNs, opens the door to many 
missions that can heavily involve unmanned systems.  This chapter will discuss some of 
the possible missions that combine UUVs and submarines and present some of the past 
and present Navy programs that have merged UUVs with submarines. 
B. SUBMARINE UUV MISSIONS 
Future naval battles will rely heavily on advantages gained through the 
combination of strategies, tactics, procedures, and technologies called network-centric 
warfare and implemented through the strategy of ForceNet.  These ideas rely heavily on 
Joint Force assets working together with common communication nodes.  Large-scale 
undersea networks, like those adhering to ForceNet, will be used heavily in the future of 
USW, with UUVs acting as crucial communication nodes to and from submarine and 
surface assets.   The following subsections will outline three different submarine missions 
and the future involvement UUVs will have with those missions.  Each of the three 
missions (ISR, Communications, and ASW) can be evaluated as part of the overall 
ForceNet image. 
Many missions may require the submarine to have the ability to launch and 
recover a UUV, but this is not a necessary factor in analyzing the possible mission sets.  
Currently, launch and recovery efforts have been possible via torpedo tubes and vertical 
launch tubes, but none of the missions discussed in this thesis require this to happen.  
Moving forward in the militarization of UUVs, it is important to remove the “platform-




Figure 9. ForceNet concept showing network-centric connectivity to various 
undersea assets (From: Department of the Navy, 2004) 
 
1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
One of the many examples of applying ForceNet to ISR for the submarine force is 
through a program titled Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance Network (PLUSNet), a 
multi-institution effort combining key government assets via ONR and Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).  PLUSNet is an unmanned systems approach to 
undersea surveillance that involves the use of mature technologies.  The system involved 
an autonomously processed cable-free nested communication network with fixed and 
mobile sensor nodes (Martin, 2005).  
In any ISR example, including PLUSNet, there are four fundamental tasks 
necessary to complete the mission: collect, communicate, process, and act.  These tasks 
are performed in various different ways by a number of unique systems (both manned 
and unmanned).  In the case of UUVs, however, one vessel has the ability—given the 
appropriate payloads—to perform all four tasks on board.  One UUV can include sensors 
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that collect the data, a platform that communicates and processes the data, and an 
implementer on board that takes action via movement, external communication, or 
weapon deployment (Fletcher, 2001).  This concept is currently the main focus of UUV 
platform development for the Navy, namely a single, multi-payload UUV that can handle 
long (greater than 30 days) ISR missions.   
 
 
Figure 10. Operational concept of PLUSNet (From: Martin, 2005) 
 
However, one UUV does not have to have all three systems (sensor, platform, and 
implementer) on board to perform the tasks, as is the case of collaboratively networked 
UUV groups.  Instead of having one large scale UUV with multiple payloads performing 
multiple missions, the groups of small UUVs would include single payloads performing 
individual missions.  These UUVs would then communicate data amongst themselves 
and/or a larger node (either a separate UUV or manned vessel) to gain a common 
operational picture of the battlespace.  Currently, DARPA has given some funding to 
develop grouped UUV programs, but this is not the main focus of the submarine force. 
In both cases, unmanned systems add a strategic advantage to the war-fighter and 
will allow friendly forces to gather ISR information from locations otherwise currently 
inaccessible or of high risk to manned systems.  Possible ISR missions using these 
strategies include (Department of the Navy, 2004): 
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• Persistent and tactical intelligence collection 
• Chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, and explosive detection and 
localization 
• Near-land and harbor monitoring 
• Deployment of leave-behind surveillance sensors or sensor arrays 
• Specialized mapping and object detection and localization 
In one example of persistent and tactical intelligence collection, a single SSGN 
could deploy one or more UUVs a safe distance from the shoreline and sit out of harm’s 
way while they patrol harbors, collecting ISR data and eventually returning to the host 
platform to refuel, upload data, and receive necessary operator level maintenance.  This 
mission will free up valuable time for the submarine and the Special Operating Forces 
(SOF) on board to perform other valuable missions.  Ultimately, due to the simplistic 
nature and emerging technologies, the submarine ISR mission-set will see the first full 
scale use of UUVs. 
2. Communications 
Communication is an important aspect for all military operations.  UGVs and 
UAVs have distinct advantages of being able to easily communicate large amounts of 
data over long distances in air.  Underwater communications, however, are not quite as 
simple and pose many problems in the area of USW.  One solution to the problem of 
undersea communication is a concept called “Seaweb.”  Seaweb uses battery-limited 
sensor technology to set up a wide-area network with expendable network nodes.  In an 
article entitled “Enabling Undersea ForceNET with Seaweb Acoustic Networks” in the 
Biennial Review 2003, author Joseph Rice of SPAWAR San Diego concluded that: 
Undersea, off-board, autonomous systems will enhance the war-fighting 
effectiveness of submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, amphibious forces, 
battle groups, and space satellites.  Wide-area sensor grids, leave behind 
multi-static sonar sources, mine-hunting robots, and AUVs are just a few 
of the battery-powered, deployable devices that will augment space and 
naval platforms. (Rice, 2003) 
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In this concept, communication between non-tethered UUVs and submarines are 
provided via underwater digital acoustic communications (ACOMMS).  ACOMMS is a 
short-range, modem-like communication method that is often left unencrypted (though it 
could easily be encrypted).  In 2005, Seaweb ran three experiments using their 
expendable node technology to aid in the navigation of several types of UUVs.  These 
tests showed that undersea ACOMMS technologies using multiple scattered nodes are a 
viable solution for naval communication.  The next step for Seaweb will be to utilize the 
sensor nodes to communicate to and from UUVs and submarines, as well as relay 
mission specific information to and from satellites via various surface assets, as shown in 
Figure 11 (Rice, 2005).  
 
 
Figure 11. Seaweb acoustic communication and navigational network model (From: 
Rice, 2005) 
 
A downside of the Seaweb concept is the necessity to set up a complex undersea 
communications network in unfriendly waters.  In the future, the application of 
submarine launched systems will allow these networks to be setup covertly.  The next 
step in a program will be to utilize groups of UUVs as the communication nodes.  There 
are multiple programs being worked on by industry that utilize this theory and have the 
ability to perform the desired missions. 
 26
3. Anti-Submarine Warfare 
The continuing submarine threat ensures ASW is a key component of maintaining 
dominance of the sea.  Though some ASW tactics use surface and air assets to detect, 
track, and engage undersea threats, the submarine has always played a vital role in 
assisting in deterring the enemy.  As the enemy moves the battles closer to shore and 
engages in littoral warfare, the current tactics of war fighting change.  In an attempt to 
understand this threat better, Task Force ASW has instituted a new focus on littoral ASW 
and identified three distinct categories of ASW, outlined in Table 5 and shown in Figure 
12 (Department of the Navy, 2004). 
 
Table 5. Task Force ASW nomenclature with descriptions  
(After: Department of the Navy, 2004) 
Nomenclature Description 
Hold at Risk Monitoring all the submarines that exit a port or transit a 
chokepoint. 
Maritime Shield Clearing and maintaining a large Carrier Strike Group (CSG or 
ESG) operating area free of threat submarines. 
Protected Passageway Clearing and maintaining a route for an ESG from one operating 





Figure 12. Task Force ASW model depicting nomenclature (From: Department of 
the Navy, 2004) 
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UUVs can prove useful in all three categories described by Task Force ASW, but 
will have the greatest impact in the “Hold at Risk” scenario.  The force multiplication 
factor added by UUVs will allow them to constantly patrol barrier choke points at low 
speeds and monitor harbor traffic (Button, Kamp, Curtin, & Dryden, 2009).  The general 
concept for this scenario is to launch the patrolling UUVs from a surface vessel, such as 
LCS, and allow them to travel to the “Hold at Risk” location undetected.  Submarines can 
aid in this operation by deploying the UUVs from closer in shore, still remaining 
undetected but cutting down on the transit time and energy loss of the UUVs. 
While on location, the UUVs have three possible variations of the “Hold at Risk” 
mission.  They could (Department of the Navy, 2004): 
• Employ non-lethal weaponry 
• Employ lethal weaponry 
• Accumulate intelligence information about threat submarines (both 
individually and collectively) 
These variations could change, however, if the UUV is in communication with a 
friendly submarine.  Instead of making the determination locally whether to employ 
weaponry (lethal or not), the UUVs could communicate using underwater acoustics with 
the nearest SSN, allowing the decision to be made on board and relayed back to the 
UUV.  Additionally, the UUVs and friendly submarines could remain in constant 
communication, relaying valuable mission and classification data, drastically increasing 
the overall effectiveness of the Task Force ASW approach.  Unfortunately, there are 
severe limitations in the bandwidth and range of ACOMMS, rendering its technology 
more of a risk than a benefit (in most cases).  
C. PAST AND PRESENT NAVY SUBMARINE UUV PROGRAMS 
Currently there is no formal UUV program of record relating to submarine 
operations.  There have been, however, programs of record that have been cancelled due 
to various reasons.  These extinct programs can provide useful insight into how the 
systems will affect the lives of sailors on board submarines.  In this section, four  
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different UUV programs will be succinctly discussed to provide a background and 
lessons learned for the manning and maintainability requirements of future UUV 
programs. 
1. Near-Term Mine Reconnaissance System 
The Near-term Mine Reconnaissance System (NMRS) was a contract that was 
awarded to Northrop Grumman Ocean Systems via a sole source proposal.  Leveraging 
off of existing work done by Northrop Grumman, the NMRS was a two-vehicle platform 
that was originally tested by the Navy in 1998.  The two vehicles were the same diameter 
and slightly shorter than a mark-48 torpedo and were able to be launched and recovered 
from a single SSN torpedo tube.  The NMRS proved the ability to utilize basic 
autonomous operation while using a fiber-optic tether link to the submarine to send the 
information gathered by its forward and side looking sonar arrays. 
The program was originally designed with a very limited set of requirements to be 
an immediate, simpler solution for a submarine UUV program.  The program showed a 
lot of promise of successfully operating an autonomous vehicle launched from a SSN, but 
the funding for it was cancelled to support the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System 
(LMRS) program. 
2. Long-Term Mine Reconnaissance System 
When the NMRS system was announced, the Navy also announced plans to 
produce a LMRS with a larger set of requirements than its predecessor.  After a time-
consuming three-phase down-select process, the contract was awarded to Lockheed 
Martin with the intent of a service date of FY 2005.  The program ultimately did not meet 
the requirements given by the Navy and was cancelled, but it is a good example of a 
UUV program with a solid set of operational requirements. 
The initial Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the LMRS specified a 
threshold/objective sortie reliability of 0.93/0.96 for a 40-hour mission.  This reliability 
included performing all mission critical activities (preparation, launch, mission, recovery, 
and post-mission activities) without a mission critical failure.  Additionally, there was a 
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specified threshold/objective for sortie launch availability of 0.86/0.92.  The manning and 
maintainability aspects of the LMRS were also clearly defined in the ORD.  For 
maintainability and logistics support, the LMRS was given the requirement to support a 
6-month submarine patrol and do so with a 20-year operational life.  The system needed 
to be comprised of preventative and corrective maintenance measures at organizational, 
intermediate, and depot level maintenance facilities, while utilizing ship’s force and 
shore-based maintenance activities whenever possible.  Lastly, the system was to be 
operated by a dedicated cadre of less than 10 individuals, augmented by ship’s force 
(Federation of American Scientists, 1996). 
The LMRS failed due to problems with the launch and recovery mechanisms not 
being as reliable as needed to perform the critical missions demanded of the system.  The 
program ultimately was cancelled.  Unfortunately, the valuable lessons learned by 
Lockheed Martin during the development have not been properly passed on for use by 
future programs.  Additionally, perhaps due to the shortcomings of the NMRS and LMRS 
programs, the Navy has moved away from the primary focus of a UUV launched and 
recovered from a torpedo tube. 
3. Mission Reconfigurable UUV 
A spin-off of the LMRS program was the Mission Reconfigurable UUV 
(MRUUV) program.  This program had the intent of using a common UUV body with 
multiple modules containing specific payloads that can be varied to run different 
missions, and was scheduled to enter the fleet in 2008.  One main requirement of the 
MRUUV was that it had to have the ability to share a common launch and recovery 
system with the LMRS; the problems with the LMRS trickled down to the MRUUV 
program.  Although the program had a lot of potential for completing ISR missions and 
creating a mission-flexible UUV, it was cancelled in 2008 due to lack of funding. 
4. Current Projects 
Since the Navy does not have a formal submarine UUV program of record it has, 
instead, various projects that it is working on through different research funding sources 
and managed by the Advanced Development Office (ADO).  The new way of thinking is 
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to adapt existing platforms in use by industry or research organizations and develop them 
for military use.   Some benefits of the Navy using development and research 
organizations for funding are that the systems can be developed without formally 
defining missions or requirements and it puts the systems in the hands of the operators to 
gain their confidence and trust moving forward.  The downside, which has proven to be 
true with relation to the current submarine UUV programs in development, is that after a 
system passes the developmental tests it was designed for, there is no future funding line 
to keep the project active.  This causes systems that prove themselves feasible to lack 
future development into formal programs. 
a. Sea Stalker 
The Sea Stalker UUV is a spinoff of the original Sea Horse UUV program 
and is a product of the Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory (PSU 
ARL).  The Sea Stalker is a 38-inch diameter platform with a speed of nearly 5 knots.  
The Sea Stalker UUV has proven developmental testing while being launched and 
recovered from the USS Bainbridge (DDG-96) and is projected to be submarine 
deployable from a dry deck shelter (DDS) on a SSGN (Kenny & Belz, 2008).  The Sea 
Stalker is designed for ISR and command and control by using a set of retractable 
antennas to combine stealth and functionality.  A downfall of the Sea Stalker program is 
power; due to submarine restrictions, it cannot use lithium battery technology and is 
currently supplied by alkaline (D-Cell) battery technology.  The future of the Sea Stalker 
program is not known, but it has shown some technological capabilities that are possible 




Figure 13. Monopole retractable antenna concept as used in the Sea Stalker UUV 
(From: Mullins, 2009) 
 
b. Sea Maverick 
The Sea Maverick UUV is another PSU ARL project.  The Sea Maverick 
is larger and faster than the Sea Stalker – 48-inch diameter with a top speed approaching 
15 knots while submerged.  This increase in size changes the functionality completely as 
it is no longer able to be launched via a submarine DDS, therefore requiring a support 
ship, like LCS, or a complex redesign for a SSGN D5 missile tube launch.  In September 
of 2009 the Sea Maverick UUV completed operational testing with the Joint Interagency 
Task Force (JIATF) South off the coast of Key West, Florida.  The UUV was deployed 
using the NAWC 38 Ranger class support ship operated by the Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR) and maintained mission support communications via satellite with 
JIATF South (United States Southern Command, 2009).  The reports of the system 
performance show that it was a successful test and the operators have high hopes for the 




Figure 14. Sea Maverick UUV shown on launch crane during JIATF South exercise 
(From: United States Southern Command, 2009) 
 
c. Other Projects 
Though it is no longer a primary focus, the Navy has not completely 
moved away from the smaller, torpedo tube launched UUVs.  Various projects are being 
worked on but are beyond the classification level of this thesis.  Some concepts include a 
torpedo tube launched AUV similar to the ASM-X used by the French Navy, on which 
would remain tethered to the submarine for instantaneous data transfer for ISR.  Because 
of complications with the recovery of the system, it can be left behind or recovered by a 
platform similar to LCS. 
D. POSSIBLE SUBMARINE / UUV INTERACTIONS 
There are many different roles for the submarine when working in tandem with a 
UUV.  It is a common misconception that a program involving submarines and UUVs 
will require the submarine to play an important role is all aspects of the mission of the 
UUV.  Though ideally this would be the case, it is more realistic to look at the 
incremental interactions between submarines and UUVs.  This section will outline a few 
of the various interactions that could exist between the submarine and UUV.     
1. Launch and Recovery 
Ideally, a submarine would be able to both launch and recover a UUV.  There are 
several options to consider for how to manage a system that can both launch and recover 
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UUVs, including 1) torpedo tubes (conventional or oversized), 2) hangars (DDS or wet 
deck), 3) vertical launch tube (D5 or other), and 4) piggy back. 
The two most commonly documented ideas are via a conventional torpedo tube 
and DDS.  Though the LMRS was unable to develop a reliable recovery arm for a UUV, 
the technology is still feasible and Figure 15 shows an example of an attachment that 
could be added to a conventional torpedo tube to be used for both launch and recovery.  
This example, similar to the original LMRS design, would use homing and docking sonar 
guides to recover a UUV onto a recovery arm built into one of the four torpedo tubes 
(Hardy & Barlow, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 15. Visualization of UUV recovery via a single conventional torpedo tube 
(From: Hardy & Barlow, 2008) 
 
The technical challenges behind successfully recovering UUVs into torpedo tubes 
is not the only reason the Navy is not pursuing this technology.  The torpedo rooms of a 
Los Angeles- and Virginia-class submarine have only four torpedo tubes and the use of 
one tube (or more) for UUVs would severely limit the capability of the submarine during 
a wartime scenario.  Additionally, space in the torpedo room is very limited and any 
equipment necessary for the UUVs would further limit the amount of torpedoes that can 
be kept on-board.  These and other disadvantages, as well as advantages, of using a 
torpedo tube launched UUV are outlined in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Key advantages and disadvantages of using a conventional torpedo tube 
for UUV launch and recovery (After: Hardy & Barlow, 2008) 
Key Advantages Key Disadvantages 
− Permits multiple types of 21 inch torpedo 
type UUVs to be deployed 
− Assuming recovery can be undertaken 
then UUV maintenance, recharging and 
payload reconfiguration activities are 
made easier inside the submarine in a 
clean, dry environment. When not in use 
the UUV is stored dry and safe. 
− Potentially minimal impact on the overall 
submarine design in terms of 
arrangement and arguably easier to 
retrofit the system to an existing 
submarine. 
− Potential to utilize existing torpedo 
discharge systems. 
− Allows covert UUV deployment. 
− Less risk of aborted UUV recovery 
fouling submarine propeller 
− Constrains AUV design to 21 inch 
torpedo design with consequential 
endurance and payload capacity 
constraints. 
− If recovery is required, recovery system 
will most likely take up capacity of at 
least one torpedo tube (unless modular 
recovery system design is employed that 
can be retrieved into the weapons 
stowage compartment). 
− Additional stowage’s required in the 
weapons stowage compartment. 
− Recovery is arguably more difficult when 
submarine is in transit. 
 
Due to the importance of torpedoes and the robust design of the current forward 
end of a submarine, a redesign of the torpedo room to accommodate for UUVs is not an 
option.  Fortunately, for the future development of UUVs, SOF missions have 
incorporated the use of the DDS on Los Angeles-class submarines, starting with the USS 
Dallas (SSN-700) in early 2000 (Rehana, 2000).  Since their deployment, these external 
hangars have been discussed, developed, and tested for use with UUVs.  If it is the intent 
of the Navy to have a submarine both launch and recover a UUV (or group of UUVs) the 
viable near-term option is most likely to be a DDS, though it does come with some major 
disadvantages, including reducing capability of the host submarine (increased signature, 




Figure 16. Dry deck shelter on back of Los Angeles-class submarine  
(From: Rehana, 2000) 
 
 
Table 7. Key advantages and disadvantages of using a dry deck shelter for UUV 
launch and recovery (After: Hardy & Barlow, 2008) 
Key Advantages Key Disadvantages 
− Permits larger and greater range of AUVs 
to be deployed Dry CMH weight will 
almost certainly preclude fitting of CMH 
on smaller submarines. 
− UUV maintenance, recharging and 
payload reconfiguration activities made 
easier inside the DDS. 
− When not in use the AUV is stored dry 
and safe. 
− Likely to be able to retrofit such a system 
to an existing submarine of sufficient size 
− Potential to build in most DDS and UUV 
support systems to allow for fast fitting to 
submarine 
− Could be designed to support transfer of 
human maintainers between main 
pressure hull and DDS to undertaken 
maintenance tasks, etc 
− UUV deployment and recovery system 
could be simpler 
− DDS is likely to require complex drain 
down and flood systems, air and pressure 
management systems, etc. 
− Safety justification is likely to be harder 
if divers are required to work in and 
outside the DDS. 
− Recovery is arguably more difficult when 
submarine is in transit. 
− Does not allow covert UUV deployment.  
− Impacts on submarine signature and 
maneuverability, etc. 
− Potential fin wake effects for L&R whilst 
in transit. 
 
2. Launch Without Recovery 
A short-term solution to having a successful submarine UUV program will be to 
separate the mechanisms for launch and recovery.  Whether it is from a torpedo tube, 
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missile tube, or DDS, having a submarine complete only the launch portion of the 
mission will incorporate the benefits of a quick, stealthy deployment while avoiding the 
technical challenges faced by recovery at speed and depth.  Additionally, the lack of 
submarine recovery will avoid the drawback of space considerations to support 
organizational level maintenance. 
There are two options to consider for the recovery portion of the experiment: 
• Abandonment.  This method is costly and controversial, but would be 
ideal for situations where the data collected by a UUV is crucial, but the 
risk of recovery is too great.  The UUV system would need to have some 
form of “self destruction” in order to maintain the security of the collected 
data and types of technologies used.  Though there are few missions that 
would call for abandonment as a primary end state, it is a procedure that 
should be considered in the background of most sensitive UUV 
deployments in case the primary mode of retrieval does not work – 
including operations in which the UUV could be entangled in the undersea 
environment (i.e., fishing nets and reefs). 
• Support Ship.  A method being considered by the USN is the use of a 
support ship, such as a Destroyer or LCS, to recover a submarine-launched 
UUV after its mission has been completed.  Prior to recovery, the UUV 
will bury itself into the seafloor, hover, or surface, waiting for a recovery 
signal from the support ship. 
3. Non-physical Interactions 
It is possible for a submarine UUV program to be successful without any physical 
interaction amongst the two entities.  In this case, the UUVs would need to be deployed 
from a support ship or directly from land.  Regardless of the form of deployment, there 
are several possible non-physical interactions between the submarine and UUV, 
including mission control, consumer and interrogator of data, and docking station 
delivery. 
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The mechanism for launch and recovery will play a vital role in the set of 
missions able to be accomplished by a UUV program, but each of the interactions 
discussed above hold true for all forms of UUV launch and recovery.  Designing UUV 
and submarine interactions independent of the launch source will help transition to a less 
“platform centric” design of UUV systems.  When systems can be designed without the 
platform in mind, there is more room for growth and an increased chance of long term 
success for a program. 
a. Mission Control 
In the near-term, it is unlikely that a UUV will be fully autonomous and 
able to complete its entire mission with no communication back to an operator.  Instead, 
it is more likely that the UUVs would operate under the “fixed initiative” level of 
autonomy.  Similar to the way UAVs are operated, UUVs will be able to perform a 
majority of their functions autonomously, but will need to remain in communication with 
an operator to provide and update critical mission data. 
As discussed earlier, undersea communications are more difficult than 
those faced by UAVs in the air and UGVs on the ground.  With the exception of physical 
linked communications, such as fiber optic links, successful non-acoustic undersea 
communications require short distances between the transmitter and receiver.  In covert 
situations, a submarine operation in the area of interest (AOI) may be necessary to ensure 
short distance communications.  Though the concept is well understood, it is not well 
studied.  Submarines should be viewed as the top method of mission control in forward 
UUV operating areas, even if the system was not launched from the submarine. 
b. Consumer and Interrogator of Data 
There are instances where submarines will require the valuable data 
collected from a UUV, but not be in control of the UUV.  In these cases, the submarines 
will consume and interrogate the data sent from the UUV.  One example of this involves 
in the mine detection mission.  Currently, MCM missions are the focus of many non-
submarine UUV programs.  In these programs, the UUV patrols the AOI and returns to a 
predetermined set point.  The data collected is manually downloaded by the operator 
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through a data-link between the system and laptop computer where it is then analyzed as 
necessary.  With relatively slight advances in technology, these programs can evolve to 
include sending the data to a submarine for consumption and interrogation by the crew 
aboard the submarine.  Removing the “middle man” will increase the efficiency of the 
area search and provide the submarine crew with important tactical data in as short of a 
time as possible, without the maintainability or manning responsibility of many of the 
proposed UUV programs. 
c. Docking Station Delivery 
The two greatest technical challenges of a UUV program are endurance 
and underwater communications.  One theory that can both add to the longevity of a 
UUV deployment and increase the bandwidth of communication to and from the UUV is 
the use of a submerged docking station.  Various systems have different theories on the 
technical features of the dock and some systems only perform one of the functions, but in 
all cases the high level theories remain the same. 
 
 
Figure 17. Flying plug attaching to a communications dock (From: Cowen, Briest, & 
Dombrowski, 1997) 
 
One SPAWAR program that combined both charging and communication 
into the same docking station was a mid-90s program entitled Distributed Surveillance 
Sensor Network (DSSN).  Experiments were conducted to prove the feasibility of a 
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“flying plug” concept, where a tethered ROV would dock into a communication station 
and relay high bandwidth communications over fiber-optic networks.  The flying plug 
would complete a link between the host platform, generally a submarine, and all entities 
attached to the fiber optic network (Cowen, Briest, & Dombrowski, 1997). 
The concept of the flying plug has great advantages that are beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but what it does provide is some proven undersea docking 
technologies.  Branching from the flying plug technology, the DSSN project used a low 
cost Odyssey AUV developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  The DSSN 
experiment, performed in Buzzard’s Bay, MA proved the ability to perform an 
underwater docking for a small scale UUV by way of three different guidance methods: 
optical, magnetic, and acoustic (Cowen, Briest, & Dombrowski, 1997).  More 
importantly for this thesis, the experiments showed the feasibility of a low cost undersea 
dock for charging and data communication. 
 
 
Figure 18. Docking station and remote interface used in DSSN experiment (After: 
Cowen, Briest, & Dombrowski, 1997) 
 
Moving forward with the DSSN concept, a submarine could deliver a 
docking station, similar in concept but more advanced in technologies, to the one shown 
in Figure 18, allowing a UUV deployed in an enemy AOI to utilize the docking station 
for either charging or communicating or both.  The use of a forward deployed docking 
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station would be able to keep UUVs in forward locations longer while allowing mission 
supports assets, such as submarines and surface vessels, to remain outside of high risk 
areas. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
It is important to note that this chapter was written with classification levels in 
mind.  It was not intended as a teaching point of the vast missions of UUVs and 
submarines, but as a background to the ideas of the important role UUVs will play when 
they are in tandem with submarines.  Pertinent areas of the interactions section will be 
revisited during the systems engineering section.  The missions and programs discussed 
in this chapter will be further analyzed in the Systems Engineering discussion. 
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IV. APPLICABLE LESSONS LEARNED FROM UGVS AND UAVS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
UGVs and UAVs have been in use longer than UUVs.  This longevity provides 
the UGVs and UAVs with valuable lessons learned that can be applied to their undersea 
counterparts.  Additionally, as shown in a report of the budgets of the DoD in FY2007-
2013 in Figure 19, unmanned maritime systems (UMS) as a whole are set to receive far 
less funding than their airborne unmanned counterparts (Button, Kamp, Curtin, & 
Dryden, 2009).  To maximize use of the small budget, applicable lessons that can be 
translated from UAVs and UGVs to UUVs can have a sizable impact on technological 
development in the undersea domain. 
 
 
Figure 19. FY2007-2013 DoD Funding for unmanned platforms (From: Button, 
Kamp, Curtin, & Dryden, 2009) 
 
This section will review a brief history of UGVs and UAVs, discuss their 
similarities with UUVs, and provide several lessons that can be applied toward the 
manning and maintainability aspect of UUVs in support of submarine missions.  Each of 
the eleven lessons learned are summarized quickly and will be used in support of the 
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conclusions of this thesis.  Not all lessons learned can be applied in the same manner.  
Additionally, not all lessons learned will be applicable to all UUV systems.  
B. UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES 
1. Brief History of the UGV 
The development of UGVs with nontrivial capabilities has its roots in the late 
1960s with the first major development of the “Shakey” system.  Though “Shakey” faced 
challenges with the autonomy aspect and was considered a failed program, the system 
started the mobile robot baseline.  The 1980s would see the outdated program evolve into 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) program Autonomous Land 
Vehicle (ALV).  With a goal of using a realistic environment for research, the ALV 
demonstrated artificial intelligence in mobile robots for military use.  The Army’s look at 
UGVs in the 1980s transitioned to use by the Department of the Navy by including 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) applications funded by the 
Naval Ocean Systems Center, in conjunction with Marine Corps research.  Similar to 
modern UUV applications, RSTA programs provide battle space awareness to mission 
commanders from behind enemy lines.  Today, all branches of the DoD have UGV 
programs spanning a variety of missions from disposing of bombs and transporting gear 
to performing maintenance and gathering intelligence (Gage, 1995). 
2. Similarities Between UGVs and UUVs 
Modern UGVs and UUVs face similar technological development challenges.  
Figure 20 shows six key areas for UGVs and further breaks down autonomous behavior.  
This figure could easily replace the center block UGV with a UUV and have the same 
meaning (National Research Council, 2002).  This similarity leads to the potential of 




Figure 20. UGV technology areas (From: National Research Council, 2002) 
 
Beyond the functional commonalities, the development cycle and mission sets for 
future UGVs are similar to UUVs.  In a publication for the Army titled “Technology 
Development for Army Unmanned Ground Vehicles,” the National Research Council 
postulates four example systems of UGVs for Army development.  The four systems 
discussed in great detail in the article are 1) a small robotic building and tunnel searching 
vehicle (“Searcher”), 2) a small-unit logistics mover (“Donkey”), 3) an unmanned 
wingman ground vehicle (“Wingman”), and 4) an autonomous hunter-killer team 
(“Hunter-Killer”).  These four examples, summarized in Table 8, are linked to sample 
capabilities and missions (edited below to include missions most analogous to UUVs) in 
a similar style to the different classes of UUVs currently being developed for the Navy.    
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Table 8. UGV example systems, capability classes, and potential mission 
applications (After: National Research Council, 2002) 
Example System Capability Class Possible Applications 
Searcher Teleoperated ground 
vehicle 










Remote sensor, counter-reconnaissance, 





Deep RSTA, combined arms, static area 
defense, reconnaissance 
 
Not unlike UUVs (or ROVs in some cases), each example system has various 
levels of human control and support as shown in Table 9.  The human control of the 
example UGVs, however, is significantly different from the planned use of UUVs for the 
Navy.  Underwater communications (especially those at speed and depth) are not as 
simple and straightforward as on land line of sight communications.  This difference does 
change the relationship the operator can have with the platform in a UUV (vice UGV), 
that does not fully discount the similarities between the two systems. 
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Table 9. Human control, human support, and health maintenance for the example 
UGV systems (After: National Research Council, 2002) 
System Human Control Human Support Health Maintenance 
Searcher − Control by joystick or 
touch screen 
− Continuous control for 
planning and 
navigation 
− Maximum of one 




− High physical 
reliability, low 
maintenance 
Donkey − Program electronic 
paths to be followed 




− Maximum of one 
supervisor and two 
maintenance 
technicians will be 
able to operate a 
small (10-12) donkey 
team 




diagnostics for remote 
operator 
− Ability to know when 
to call for help 
Wingman − Direct new locations 
while en route 
− Monitor sensors and 
other inputs 





− No more than one 
assistant section 
leader (controller) 
and one maintenance 
technician 
− Design for combat 
survivability 













− Override in case of 
changes in situation 
− Control is by on-duty 
staff officer at 
headquarters 
− Non self-repair 
maintenance done by 
small groups (<10 
personnel) to support 
up to five teams (10 
killers, 50 hunters 
each)  
− Self-repair by 
reconfiguring 
components 
− Self-repair by self-
reprogramming 
 
3. Lessons Learned from UGVs 
The relatively mature nature of UGVs provides some lessons learned in the 
deployment of UUVs for submarine related missions.  In 2001, SPAWAR San Diego 
published a technical report “Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) Lessons Learned” 
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which related UGV lessons to UUVs for MCM in the EOD community.  The “Top 10” 
issues found during their study were broken into three main categories:  operations, 
programmatics, and technologies as shown in Table 10 (Blackburn, Laird, & Everett, 
2001).  The highlighted portions of the chart have been summarized below as the three 
major lessons learned that apply to submarine missions from a manning and 
maintainability standpoint, and a fourth lesson independent of the “Top 10” list is added 
at the end. 
 
Table 10. Top 10 issues compiled from UGV lessons learned for MCM UUVs 
(After: Blackburn, Laird, & Everett, 2001) 
Category Top 10 Issues 
Uncertainty promotes survival* 
Many simple cooperating agents are superior to one complex agent*
Operations 
New technology forces changes in operations 
Understanding between the user and the developer is critical 
Understanding the technology is cost-effective 
Programmatics 
Simpler solutions provide better foundations* 
Integration is not easy 
Communications are not dependable 
Automaticity is not autonomy 
Technologies 
The road from teleoperation to autonomy does not exist 
  
 *Issues used for UGV Lessons 1-3  
 
a. UGV Lesson 1: Uncertainty Promotes Survival 
Regardless of the mission of an unmanned system, it needs to be designed 
to be reliable and survivable.  A robot designed for combat survivability, whether a UGV, 
UAV, or UUV, will have the ability to last in the harsh war, or war-like, operational 
environments.  Fortunately, the random nature of unmanned control allows for 
unpredictable maneuvers, formations, and behaviors, which provide advantages in hostile 
environments (Blackburn, Laird, & Everett, 2001).  Though this random behavior will, as 
a result, decrease the chance of attrition kills (those resulting in a complete loss of the 
system) of the UUV, they will also increase the chance of mission abort kills (those 
resulting in an incomplete mission, regardless of cause).  The take-away here is that the 
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operators will need to understand the benefits in uncertainty and will need to be trained  
to balance it to assure success in the tactical settings. 
b. UGV Lesson 2: Simpler Solutions Provide Better Foundations 
A simple solution is often neglected because it does not address all of the 
system requirements.  Fundamentally, a simple solution does not have to address all of 
the requirements, as long as it does not violate any of the unaddressed requirements.  
Being that requirements are generally independent of one another, multiple simple 
systems can be integrated together, if each addresses different requirement sets.  An 
example of this was addressed in the SPAWAR team’s 2001 interview with Albert 
Bradley of WHOI.  Discussing the issue of power capability, Mr. Bradley stated: 
Most AUV designs are limited by power available. This comes out in the 
first "back of the envelope" design cycle. Those projects that then panic and 
go to the handbooks to choose "the best power source" rarely allocate enough 
effort to taming the exotic choice they came up with. There are enough 
problems to face, start a new AUV design with a simple power source. When 
it's working, then you can update the power system. (Blackburn, Laird, & 
Everett, 2001) 
The end state of the simple system approach may be more practical in a UGV than in a 
UUV, but it can be utilized in the developmental stages of a new system.  Addressing 
requirements incrementally will give operators invaluable experience with the systems 
and give the war-fighter confidence when the more complex system is deployed in the 
future.   
c. UGV Lesson 3: Many Simple Cooperating Agents are Superior to 
One Complex Agent 
UGV operators utilize many simple vehicles as a “strength in numbers” 
approach which is different than the advantages this approach gives to the undersea 
warfare communities.  Though the Navy’s decision to shy away from smaller, simpler 
UUVs has been made from a technical capability standpoint (mainly energy density and 
payloads), the concept of using smaller, networked UUVs should not be lost.   
The advantages of smaller UUVs make them a valuable asset.  First, in all 
measures there is less cost per platform and potential further savings with “economy of 
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scale” during production.  Second, less maintenance support is necessary; this is very 
applicable to submarine operations, as the UUVs can be replaced opposed to repaired 
(though the logistics of this may be daunting).  Next, there are fewer critical components.  
As system reliability is a function of critical component reliability, reducing the number 
of these allows for increased reliability through redundancy and simplicity (Blackburn, 
Laird, & Everett, 2001).  Last, the major concern with small UUVs is power and fuel; 
though larger UUVs can have longer durations and ranges, the cooperation of the small 
contingencies can offset this disadvantage. 
There are times where a complex agent is a better application than many 
simple cooperating ones.  Prior to technologies being proven, similar to what is described 
in “UGV Lesson 2,” the use of a multitude of simple and collaborative systems should be 
the preference.  After the technology has matured, larger and more complex systems can 
and should become the priority of the stakeholders.  Ultimately, the system complexity 
should be considered in a formal trade study, as discussed in Chapter II. 
d. UGV Lesson 4: Maintenance Should Be Done at the User Level 
UUV systems, like UGVs, should be designed with line replaceable units 
(LRUs).  The use of LRUs does not replace the contractor, as they will still manufacture 
the parts, perform advanced levels of maintenance, and provide long-term logistical 
support.  Additionally, LRUs minimize the contractor involvement in the maintenance, 
often drastically reducing the life cycle costs (Blackburn, Laird, & Everett, 2001).  This is 
especially true with any maintenance that will be performed on UUVs while underway.  
Modular parts and LRUs are ideal for UUVs since sailors aboard submarines (or support 
vessels like LCS) have limited space, resources, and time to perform costly, complex 
repairs. 
A formal discussion of the three levels of maintenance (organizational, 
intermediate, and depot) is presented in Chapter V.  This section will promote the 
appropriate use of all levels of maintenance, focusing on more than just the user level 
portion.  Unfortunately, especially in the case of submarines, there are size and logistical 
considerations that will not always accommodate user-level maintenance.  The important 
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lesson to be understood is that a successful program will incorporate various types of 
maintenance and, whenever possible, the maintenance routines that can be performed at 
the operator level will have compounding benefits for the entire program.   
C. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 
1. Brief History of the UAV 
The history of airplane-like UAVs for military use by Americans can be traced to 
the Interstate BQ-4/TDR as early at 1936.  Originally starting as the Navy aircraft called 
“assault drones”, the program originated as a suggestion for using remotely-controlled 
aircraft in combat (Parsch, 2005).  The 1950s-1970s would see drones evolve into use for 
surveillance missions.  Though many of these programs were promising, most were 
cancelled due to technical problems (Tetrault, 2010).  These problems caused 
commanders to lose faith in UAV technology. 
 
 
Figure 21. U.S. Navy photo of an original Interstate BQ-4/TDR (From: Parsch, 
2005) 
 
In 1982, the Israeli Air Force defeated the Syrian Air Force and changed the 
opinions of commanders toward UAVs.  Israeli forces used UAVs for decoys, jammers, 
and enemy surveillance, allowing their manned aircraft to swiftly defeat 86 Syrian 
aircraft with minimal losses (Tetrault, 2010).  Since then, Operation Desert Storm (1990-
1991) became the stepping-stone for American use of UAVs by military forces.  Modern 
day UAVs include fixed wing and rotary craft that are used for a variety of missions 
ranging between reconnaissance and surveillance of the “Global Hawk” to air-to-ground 
combat of the “Predator.” 
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2. Similarities between UUVs and UAVs 
The surveillance and communication nodes provided by UAV missions are 
similar to the needs of UUVs for the submarine force.  Future UUV technologies will 
focus on other UAV missions beyond ISR and into the combat and combat support 
realms.  UAVs have been developed in a wide variety of shapes and sizes, each of which, 
to some extent, support modular mission packages and LRUs.   
Modern day UAVs face some of the same challenges as UUVs.  First, UAVs are 
limited by their communication and bandwidth.  These issues vary from the types of 
issues dealing with underwater communications but still have the same result in the 
battlefield.  Second, UAVs lack intelligent autonomy and target recognition, and without 
complete “intelligent” autonomy in both UAVS and UUVs, they will not be used during 
complex missions that require extremely high confidence levels of maneuvering and 
target recognition.  Third, operations with manned platforms pose the same problems in 
UAVs as UUVs; fear of collisions call in to question the safety of both platforms.  Last, 
UAVs do not have a highly reliable recovery mechanism across all platforms; recovery of 
UUVs at sea poses the same setbacks as UAVs (National Research Council, 2005). 
3. Lessons Learned from UAVs 
The operational experiences of UAVs across all branches of the DoD have had 
the systems evolve drastically during OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  This 
data has been thoroughly documented and is starting to be shared amongst all interested 
parties.  UUV development can take many lessons from the struggles of UAVs over the 
past decade. 
a. UAV Lesson 1: System Requirements Should Be Clear Up Front 
“UGV Lesson 2” stated that requirements can be met incrementally.  
However, this does not imply that the requirements need not be stated at the beginning of 
the program.  UAV support for OIF and OEF required the USAF to field UAVs as 
quickly as possible and therefore required a rapid acquisition strategy.  As a result, all of 
the requirements were not clearly defined before design and production.  This has lead to 
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uncertainty in the long-term support status of the aircraft (Drew, Shaver, Lynch, 
Amouzegar, & Snyder, 2005).  This should not be the issue for UUVs as there is 
currently not the same rapid demand faced by the Navy as was UAVs for the Air Force.  
Though all requirements need not be addressed during the developmental stages of 
UUVs, all should be clearly stated at the beginning of a program.  This lesson will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter V. 
b. UAV Lesson 2: Acquire Reliability and Maintainability Data 
Throughout All Stages of Development 
If the event arises, however, that a UUV system will require rapid 
acquisition, it will be important for researchers to take advantage of every opportunity to 
gather data.  Reliability and maintainability data is able to be recorded and analyzed in 
prototypes and first generation systems, which was not done for the USAF deployment of 
UAVs (Drew, Shaver, Lynch, Amouzegar, & Snyder, 2005).  This data is important for 
determining manning and supportability metrics and should be analyzed for all UUV 
systems tested.  Additionally, UUV programs that have been cancelled will almost 
always have this data available and should be shared across programs. 
c. UAV Lesson 3: Structure a Process for Sharing Data 
The “stove-piped” programs created in the DoD often leave good sources 
of data unknown, or unavailable, to other programs.  UAV conferences are starting to 
break down the barriers of information and UUVs need to follow this same direction 
(Drew, Shaver, Lynch, Amouzegar, & Snyder, 2005).  The Navy’s PEO LMW has taken 
the right steps in opening the lines of communication between UUV programs by the 
creation of the ADO, but this needs to be extended to include minor programs, other 
defense programs, and industry, where applicable. 
From a UUV program to UUV program aspect, the data being shared 
should be a combination of operational and technical data.  Operational data may help 
newer UUV programs to properly focus on missions, tasks, and functions.  The technical 
data shared amongst the two programs is perhaps the most valuable.  Discussing the 
success (or failure) of different sensor packages, energy sources, and data analysis 
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software will increase the probability of success of new programs.  Additionally, there is 
a lot of data that can and should be shared amongst UUV programs and UAV/UGV 
programs.  This data can also be both operational and technical, but a majority of the 
important lessons learned would be in the operational sense (as the technical differences 
between the two programs can be extreme).  When possible, the Navy should look at 
what successful UAV programs have done for maintenance and manning challenges and 
lessons that can be learned.  For example, some of the Navy’s foremost UUV operators 
modeled their manning after what they discovered with the Predator UAV program.  This 
suggestion could branch into comparing airspace with waterspace management data to 
find trends that will help simplify the currently complex waterspace management plans. 
d. UAV Lesson 4: Limit the Number of Design Configurations 
Spiral development and prototyping of UAVs have created several 
different configurations supported by the USAF.  Each unique design complicates the 
support and maintenance of the UAV fleet (Drew, Shaver, Lynch, Amouzegar, & Snyder, 
2005).  In an effort to curb the cost of production, logistics, maintenance, and operation 
the Navy should rethink the UUV design and limit the number of unique platforms.  The 
use of LRUs and modularly designed mission components should then fit the common 
sized components and allow a platform to perform a variety of different missions.  
Creating a single chassis that can be used amongst all programs is an ideal, 
but probably an unrealistic expectation.  Instead, the Navy should develop standards for 
interoperability in their UUV design.  These standards should include launch and 
recovery design features and modular open architecture features.  The standards should 
not be set across all UUVs, but amongst UUVs in a size / displacement group. 
e. UAV Lesson 5: Consider Supportability Up Front 
Supportability should be considered an important cost driver during the 
pre-concept design phase of a system.  Operations and support (O&S) costs comprise the 
largest individual percentage of LCC for almost every major program.  Additionally, 
reliability and maintainability attribute directly to the manpower calculation for 
unmanned systems.  O&S costs cannot be avoided, so they should not be delayed 
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(Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2002).  Many programs of record that have performed 
admirably during testing have been cancelled due to LCC considerations.  However, 
these programs could have been designed better or avoided altogether if O&S structures 
had been considered initially. 
In a submarine UUV program, the supportability can vary drastically.  
Chapters V and VI will discuss in more detail the different options available.  These 
include the use of cadres of personnel to support operations as opposed to the use of 
ship’s force and the maintenance being completed onboard a support ship instead of the 
submarine.  There are drastic differences in the system designs that can be incorporated 
based on these supportability decisions, which is why they should be made early in the 
system development process.  These options should also be included in the trade studies 
discussed. 
f. UAV Lesson 6: Endurance Has its Benefits 
The UAV experience has shown that longer sorties have resulted in less 
maintenance due to the reduction in number of cycles and cycle-related fatigue.  Research 
has shown that for UAVs a 24 hour sortie length shows a significant reduction in 
maintenance man-hours per flight hour (assuming a similar level of maintainability), as 
shown in Figure 22 (Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2002).  The conclusion of less 
maintenance for longer sorties may seem obvious, but the degree to which manpower can 





Figure 22. Maintainability data as a function of sortie length for UAVs, assuming 
similar levels of maintainability (From: Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2002) 
 
UUV missions will not have the same numerical correlation to UAV 
missions, but the principles still hold true.  Current Navy UUV missions last roughly 6-8 
hours.  If this number can be increased to 48 hours, or further yet to 30 days, the impact 
these systems will have on the manning aboard their host platform can be reduced 
drastically – and that is not even considering the manning to launch and recover the 
systems.  Any time there is room to increase the mean time between maintenance 
(MTBM), the change should be considered in depth because of the impact it may have on 
supportability and LCC. 
g. UAV Lesson 7: Minimize the Levels of Redundancy 
“UGV Lesson 2” and “UGV Lesson 3” focused on simplifying the system 
to potentially reduce the amount of critical components, thereby increasing system 
reliability.  An alternative method is to create redundancy in each critical component, 
ensuring that the loss of one component does not result in a loss of the system.  Though 
redundancy increases the safety, survivability, and mission reliability, it is not without an 
increase in cost.  In order for redundancy to be cost effective, it needs to incorporate 
extremely high reliability or extremely low cost.  Trade studies have shown that systems 
that are overly redundant become more expensive than those with minimal levels of 
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redundancy; between 2-3 levels of redundancy is generally the most cost effective 
approach for UAVs, as shown in Figure 23 (Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2002), 
assuming a constant mean time between failure (MTBF) rate.  UUV systems will have 
different reliability data, but the end result of trade studies should prove to have the same 
results, namely, that risk should be balanced when considering the levels of redundancy. 
 
 
Figure 23. Relationship between redundancy and cost per flight hour for UAVs, 
assuming critical failure rate of 1/3 of MTBF (From: Lockheed Martin Corporation, 
2002) 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the history, similarity, and lessons learned of both UGVs 
and UAVs as they apply to the manning and maintainability of UUVs for use in 
submarine missions.  It is the intent of this chapter to be a brief introduction to sample 
systems and neglects many aspects of UGV and UAV operations unrelated to the core 
research of this thesis.  The eleven major lessons learned are summarized in Table 11.  It 
is not the intent of the section to be an extensive study of UGV or UAV systems, and 
further research should be done for a better understanding of the unmanned systems 
discussed in the chapter. 
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Table 11. Summary of eleven UGV and UAV lessons learned for UUVs 
Number Lesson Learned 
UGV 1 Uncertainty promotes survival 
UGV 2 Simpler solutions provide better foundations  
UGV 3 Many simple cooperating agents are superior to one complex agent 
UGV 4 Maintenance should be done at the user level 
UAV 1 System requirements should be clear up front 
UAV 2 Acquire reliability data throughout all stages of development 
UAV 3 Structure a process for sharing data 
UAV 4 Limit the number of design configurations 
UAV 5 Consider supportability up front 
UAV 6 Endurance has its benefits 










V. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to this chapter, this thesis has focused mainly on the gathering of data 
through literature reviews, internet-based resources, conferences, meetings, and 
interviews.  This chapter, however, will take the ideas discussed in Chapters II-IV and 
discuss where they fit in moving forward with a systems engineering approach to the 
development of future formal UUV programs.  This section begins with a definition of 
the systems engineering process and points out some deficiencies found in the past Navy 
submarine UUV programs.  After discussing the systems engineering approach, there is a 
section focused on the manning and maintenance requirements that will need to be 
addressed to allow UUV systems to operate successfully with the submarine force. 
However, the systems engineering approach outlined here is applicable to all stages of 
future UUV program development. 
B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
Prior to laying out the specific steps necessary to make a successful UUV 
program, it is important to define systems engineering and give an overview to the 
generic approach taken by a Systems Engineer to solve a problem.  This section will 
cover the systems engineering process, feedback, and trade studies utilized by a Systems 
Engineer. 
1. Systems Engineering Process 
One of the many methods available to understand the scope of the systems 
engineering process is outlined by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) model 
shown in Figure 24.  The model illustrates three distinct stages of converting the process 
inputs into outputs with continual trade studies and assessments before and after each 
stage (Defense Acquisition University, 2001).  Though this process was created with 
electrical/electronic engineering in mind, it is applicable in the systems engineering of 




Figure 24. DAU systems engineering process model (From: Defense Acquisition 
University, 2001) 
 
Combining the data presented in the DAU model and many other applicable 
systems engineering models, there are four fundamental stages to system design lifecycle.  
This four stage process has analysis, verification, and feedback occurring simultaneously 
with each step.  All four stages are required for a program to be “Systems Engineered” 
correctly.  To successfully complete a mission or set of missions, the four stages of the 
process need to occur in the following order: 
• Develop Requirements, based on missions 
• Determine Tasks, based on requirements 
• Create Functions, based on tasks 
• Design Components, based on functions 
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a. Developing Requirements 
Government program development tends to be done differently than in the 
civilian world, but that does not mean that the necessity for a high-level envisioning of 
the process changes.  When a program is created, it needs to begin by defining 
requirements, and these requirements should be based on the mission of the program, and 
not on the physical entities that the program wishes to create.  This was true in the case of 
UAVs and “UAV Lesson 1” and should continue to remain true with future UUV 
programs.  This means that programs should not be started with the finished product in 
mind. 
The requirements stage is often not understood by the customer.  A 
formally trained Systems Engineer will know the maxim associated with a customer 
asking an engineer to build a bridge to get across the water.  Many engineers would now 
interpret the requirement, given by the customer, to be “build a bridge”.  Unfortunately 
for the customer and the engineer, building a bridge is not the real requirement.  The real 
requirement is: get across the water.  The system developed during the process may end 
up being a bridge, or it may be a ferry, tunnel, or airplane.  Current UUV projects have 
violated this maxim of understanding the requirements. 
Proper requirement definitions are produced with the system stakeholders 
and are derived from the mission requirements.  The process is hierarchical with system, 
component, and configuration item (CI) requirements being derived from the originating 
requirements, shown in Figure 25.  Many engineers consider the role of the systems 
engineering process begins at the ORD, when in fact the Systems Engineer should work 
directly with the stakeholder to understand the requirements and eventually turn those 




Figure 25. Hierarchy of requirements (From: Buede, 2000) 
 
Two of the current submarine UUV projects being worked on for the Navy 
are the Sea Maverick and the Sea Stalker.  These programs (as discussed in Chapter III) 
have shown success in various at sea tests, but are not part of a formal program and have 
included unclear, if not completely undefined, requirements.  This shortfall has meant 
that even though the programs may have performed up to the operator’s expectations, the 
funding line is not in place for future development of the systems and, as a result, they 
may be left forever sidelined. 
b. Determining Tasks  
After determining the system requirements, the next step in systems 
architecting is to determine which tasks are necessary to meet the stated requirements.  In 
a USN system design, these tasks should be taken from the Universal Naval Task List 
(UNTL), a combination of the Universal Joint Task List and the Navy Tactical Task List.  
These extensive lists comprise of specific tasks necessary to complete missions at the 
operational and tactical levels.  The UNTL is a hierarchical list with the nomenclature for 
a naval tactical level task being “NTA.” 
A sample tactical level task from the UNTL that may apply to UUV 
missions is “NTA 1.5.2.3 Conduct Undersea/Antisubmarine Warfare.” NTA 1.5.2.3 is the 
lowest level of the “NTA 1 Deploy/Conduct Maneuver” hierarchy with sister tasks of 
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“NTA 1.5.2.1:  Conduct Surface Warfare” and “NTA 1.5.2.2 Conduct Air Superiority 
Warfare.”  Each task is given a short description describing the specific aspects of the 
task.  For “Conduct Undersea/Antisubmarine Warfare” the description is: 
To establish and maintain supremacy in assigned operating area through 
employment of assets to ensure freedom of action of friendly maritime forces 
in face of undersea threats such as submarines, mines, and underwater 
swimmers. (Department of the Navy, 2001) 
The UNTL adds to the tasks various measures of performance.  Some tasks have only a 
few suggested measures and others are more extensive.  The 22 suggested measures for 
the “Conduct Undersea/Antisubmarine Warfare” task are shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12. UNTL tactical level task measures for NTA 1.5.2.3 Conduct 
Undersea/Antisubmarine Warfare (From: Department of the Navy, 2001) 
M1 Percent Of assigned targets destroyed 
M2 Percent Of assigned targets cannot continue assigned mission 
M3 Number Of assigned targets launch weapons after engagement 
M4 Number Of assets available to prosecute subsurface threats 
M5 Percent Acoustic coverage while in torpedo danger zone 
M6 Percent Correct probable submarine classification 
M7 Percent Correct certain submarine classification 
M8 Time To search designated area 
M9 Time Required to communicate with friendly submarine 
M10 Percent Of successful communications attempts with friendly submarine 
M11 Percent Of Blue-on-Blue/Grey/White engagements 
M12 Time Of asset response time from classification of probable submarine 
until ASW platform on scene 
M13 Percent Radar flooding within LLOA during transit/in Vital Area 
M14 Percent Radar flooding within ASW CIEA 
M15 Percent Radar flooding within torpedo danger zone 
M16 Percent Probable submarine (or higher) contact engaged or negated prior to 
torpedo danger zone 
M17 Percent Probable submarine (or higher) contact within torpedo danger zone 
engaged or negated prior to attack 
M18 Number Friendly ships sunk or damaged 
M19 Number Attacks against non-submarine contacts 
M20 Minutes SCC/SSN time to complete tactical communications 
M21 Y/N BELLRINGER conducted via all available means 




The creation of the UNTL has ensured the Navy is on the right track when 
it comes to the determining the tasks stage of system development.  Future success with 
task definitions will only be guaranteed when the UNTL and UJTL are utilized during the 
systems engineering development process. 
c. Creating Functions 
Once the tasks are identified, the next step in system development is the 
definition of functions.  There are various generic functional lists (similar to the UNTL 
for tasks) or functions can be derived from scratch.  The purpose of the functional 
analysis is to define the low level activities, in the form of verbs, performed by the 
system.  These functions are created in a hierarchical format and then displayed in the 
form of a functional hierarchy, functional flow block diagrams (FFBD), enhanced 
functional flow block diagram (EFFBD), matrix (N2) diagram, and/or an Integration 
Definition for Function Modeling (IDEF0) diagram. 
Similar to the UUVs being developed by the Navy, a project at the Naval 
Postgraduate School entitled Tracking of Underwater Narco-subs using Autonomous 
Submersibles (TUNAS) created a functional analysis of a UUV for the interdiction of 
semi-submersible drug submarines in the United States Southern Command region 
(Brocht, Layne, Matson, McMurtrie, Schindler, & Vandenberg, 2009).  Though the 
mission of the system changes from a submarine deployed UUV, the high level functions 
are analogous.  From a high level, shown in Figure 26, the EFFBD broke down six high 
level functions.  A FFBD would look similar, but would not show the triggers, inputs, 




Figure 26. High level EFFBD for TUNAS sample UUV system (From: Brocht, 
Layne, Matson, McMurtrie, Schindler, & Vandenberg, 2009)  
  
An N2 matrix diagram for high level of TUNAS displays the same 
information as the EFFBD, but in a different manner.  Instead of showing flow between 
the functions and sequential order, it aligns the functions diagonally through the diagram 
and shows the input and output objects along the horizontal axes.  The directions of the 
arrows indicate the sequence in which data flows between the functions.  TUNAS N2 


































Figure 27. N2 matrix diagram for TUNAS sample UUV system (From: Brocht, 
Layne, Matson, McMurtrie, Schindler, & Vandenberg, 2009) 
 
N2 diagrams and EFFBDs/FFBDs show the same information presented in 
different manners.  The use of both of these is often considered redundant.  An IDEF0 
diagram, on the other hand, shows a unique perspective on the functional analysis. The 
purpose of an IDEF0 is to establish system boundaries and identify interfaces and bind 
the problem statement.  In addition to the inputs and outputs shown above, IDEF0 
diagrams include controls and mechanisms for each function.  IDEF0 diagrams follow a 




Figure 28. IDEF0 diagram template (From: Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006) 
 
Past programs have done a poor job of functional analysis, but formal 
training of systems engineers has led to current and future Navy programs doing a 
reasonable job with these stages of the system design process.  The downfall of the 
current program is documentation of sources for future program use.  Future UUV 
systems must continue down the path of proper functional analysis, properly 
documenting this analysis in order to enable the collaboration of that information with 
future sister programs. 
d. Designing Components 
The most successful stage of system design for the DoD is the component 
design phase, and this success can be attributed to the amount of experience the DoD has 
during the stage.  Unfortunately, when components are assigned to systems without set 
missions, requirements, tasks, and functions this stage may produce components that 
achieve seemingly triumphant results but do not do what the stakeholders need. 
Additionally, systems are being overdesigned by including components that perform  
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functions for tasks that are not necessary or do not exist.  Current UUV projects in 
development are stuck at the component design phase without the benefit of the other 
stages of systems engineering. 
The future solution comes in the form of model-based systems engineering 
(MBSE) and product lifecycle management (PLM) software.  MBSE, similar to the four 
stages of system design described in this section, creates traceability amongst 
components, functions, and tasks.  With proper MBSE, if the system developers 
determine a task is not necessary and it is deleted then associated functions and 
components will be flagged for review.  This feature can bring about drastic cost 
reductions from “over-engineering” a system from the component level.  Similarly, PLM 
software starts at the component level and focuses on the lifecycle of a product from 
cradle to grave.  This is a good way to determine the LCC of a program and predict the 
manufacturing, logistics support, and transportation costs that are often hidden in the 
design phases.  With proper systems engineering and the use of MBSE and PLM 
software, the Navy is on the right track for component design, and should apply these 
concepts to future submarine UUV programs. 
2. Feedback 
Feedback should not only be gathered internally to the system, but must be used 
from similar programs to gather valuable data necessary to maximize the probability of 
successfully engineering a new complex system. The first three submarine UUV 
programs discussed in Chapter III (NMRS, LMRS, and MRUUV) failed in gaining 
proper inter-program feedback.  Though these programs have been unsuccessful in their 
goal of creating a successful UUV system for use by the Navy, there have been valuable 
lessons learned from the programs that can be applied to future systems.  Unfortunately, 
these valuable lessons have not been properly assessed and applied to other programs 
through the correct feedback chains.  In the past, the Navy did not have a common 
program office for communicating data and feedback amongst systems. This lack of 
feedback has caused programs, with clearly stated requirements, to develop to a certain 
level (the amount of development of each system has been different) and then become 
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cancelled by the Navy only to start a new program from the beginning. Ideally, it is not 
only important that a program has requirements, but it will also need to take lessons 
learned from previous similar programs. 
3. Trade Studies 
The systems design process is an iterative process, allowing programs to flourish 
with the right amount of feedback.  Adding to these iterations are series of trade studies, 
similar to the system complexity trade study discussed in Chapter II, which will 
determine the optimal system design while varying the amount and types of inputs.  
Trade studies are performed to (Tauras, 1995): 
• Support functional analyses and allocation of performance requirements 
and design constraints, 
• Define a preferred set of performance requirements satisfying identified 
functional interfaces, 
• Determine performance requirements for lower level functions when 
higher-level performance and functional requirements cannot be readily 
resolved to the lower-level, and 
• Evaluate alternative functional architectures. 
There is not a common standard for the performance of a trade study; one 




Figure 29. Trade study process (From: Defense Acquisition University, 2001) 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into specific trade studies that a UUV 
program will perform, but it is important to understand that that all suggestions made 
throughout this thesis must be considered as only inputs (or are the result of outputs) to a 
formal trade study.  
C. MANNING AND MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 
Another approach to systems engineering is given by Benjamin S. Blanchard and 
Wolter J. Fabrycky in their textbook titled Systems Engineering and Analysis, and shown 
in Figure 30.  In this text, the authors describe systems engineering as a lifecycle and 
point out the interactions that take place amongst activities in the lifecycle.  In the 
lifecycle, there are distinct stages of design, shown in Figure 30.  These incremental 
stages allow for the inter-stage feedback to provide real time response and allows for 
flexibility in the growth of the design process.  Included in this figure, but not discussed 
 69
in the previous analysis, are the following stages: 1) production and/or construction, 2) 
utilization and support, and 3) phase-out and disposal.  The addition of these phases in 
the systems engineering process allows for manning and maintainability aspects of the 
developed systems to take part in the early developmental stages. 
 
 
Figure 30. Systems engineering lifecycle (From: Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006) 
 
1. Manning Analysis 
Future submarine UUV systems should account for manning during the 
developmental stages of the systems engineering lifecycle.  A 2010 study by the 
Congressional Budget Office determined that O&S costs make up 49% - 56% of the LCC 
for four analyzed Navy ships (MCM-1, FFG-7, DDG-51 Flight IIA, and CG-47).  The 
study showed that the smaller the vessel, the higher proportion personnel costs allocated 
in the budget.  In the case of the MCM-1 and DDG-51 Flight IIA, personnel costs 
represented up to 38% and 29%, respectively, of total LCC, and procurement costs 
accounted for less than 50% of the LCC in all cases (Elmendorf, 2010).  Even with this 
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balance, procurement costs overshadow manning costs in the average decision during the 
DoD acquisition process.  As the defense budget begins to shrink, it is imperative that 
future systems focus more on LCC than acquisition costs. 
a. Logistics Support Elements 
Manning is not always taken specifically into account when doing the 
front-end design of a system, but operations and logistics support elements are.  Table 13 
outlines the specific applications in which logistics support, including manning 
considerations, should be considered during the lifecycle for the Blanchard and Fabrycky 
systems engineering model.  This approach is augmented by “UAV Lesson 5” which 
states that programs should consider supportability up front, including in the conceptual 
design phase. 
 
Table 13. Summary of logistics support elements in the systems engineering 
lifecycle (After: Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006) 
Stage Application of Logistics Support 
Conceptual Design Quantitative and qualitative supportability 
requirements for the system. 
Preliminary Design Allocation of quantitative and qualitative 
supportability requirements. Preliminary 
supportability analysis, formal design review. 
Detail Design and 
Development 
Design support, supportability analysis, 
provisions and acquisition of logistic support 
elements, test and evaluation of logistics support 
capability, formal design review. 
Production / 
Construction 
Acquisition of logistic support elements; test and 
evaluation of logistics support capability; data 




Re-provisioning and acquisition of logistic 
support elements; data collection, analysis, and 
corrective action; system / product modification 
(as required). 
 
b. Use of a Dedicated Cadre 
Current submarine related UUVs in use by the Navy have a specific cadre 
of operators that will deploy with the systems.  While deployed, the cadre, part of the 
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Submarine Development Squadron (DEVRON) 5 UUV Detachment, will operate and 
maintain the UUVs with limited help of ship’s force.  The continued use of dedicated 
personnel working out of the same office adheres to “UAV Lesson 3” and structures a 
process for sharing data between various UUV systems.  Top Navy experts feel that 
future UUV systems will continue to utilize the cadre detachment system until UUVs 
become a completely integrated part of the submarine and are operated as a weapon or 
off-board sensor, like a torpedo or towed array. 
Future programs will see an immediate spike in manning due to the 
operators, contractors, and intelligence specialists needed, but this spike will eventually 
level off when contractors are no longer necessary to complete maintenance, intelligence 
specialists are not needed for every mission, and ship’s force eventually becomes solely 
the operators and maintainers of the UUVs.  Due to the use of a cadre, and not only ship’s 
force, the Navy must change its initial point of view of using UUVs for reducing 
manning to one of increasing capability.  The reduction of manning, if at all feasible, is a 
long-term goal of unmanned systems, but should not be thought of as an immediate 
benefit. 
c. Operator Ratings and Navy Enlisted Classification Codes 
A professionally trained cadre of individuals does bring some immediate 
benefits to the system design, development, and deployment.  First, as discussed with 
“UGV Lesson 4,” maintenance can be done at the user level.  Because the cadre works 
with the same UUVs and are not attached to the host platform, they come with experience 
in both the operating and maintaining aspects of the systems.  Additionally, new Navy 
enlisted classification (NEC) code for UUV operators, 9550, ensures future enlisted 
operators will continue to receive specialized training for the operation and maintenance 
of UUV systems. 
The source ratings are limited to submarine qualified personnel of rates 
are 1) Electronics Technician (ET), 2) Sonar Technician Subsurface (STS), 3) Fire 
Control Technician (FT), and 4) Machinist’s Mate (MM).  Because the ratings are limited 
to submarine qualified personnel, the Navy can ensure that the operators will have 
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operational experience and UUV expertise.  As UUVs move away from the use of 
detachments for operation and maintenance, the same ratings will be available as part of 
ship’s force and this will guarantee the same quality level of users as provided by the 
cadre.  Training of ship’s force in the operation and maintenance routines would be a 
long-term goal and is not something that is currently being considered top priority. 
 
 
Figure 31. Navy enlisted classification code 9550 description (From: Bureau of 
Naval Personnel, 2010) 
 
When current 9550 NEC codes report to the DEVRON 5 UUV 
Detachment, they receive mainly “on-the-job” training augmented by technical manuals 
reading, computer-based training, and department-wide training.  All UUV operators 
follow the same qualification process, as the skill sets used by the operators are 
independent of their source rating.  Once qualified, the operators deploy with the UUV 
systems and work 12-hour shifts during their deployments, lasting an average of two 
weeks each.  Additionally, the operators spend 1-2 months training and planning prior to 
each deployment. 
The size of the deployed cadre varies depending on the system being 
operated, but a general manning model would include one supervisor with at least one or 
two operators per shift, giving a minimum of three operators per deployment.  The 
leadership of these cadres is currently a mix of Warrant Officers and Limited Duty 
Officers (LDOs), and this will most likely not change for cadres of the future. 
2. Maintainability Analysis 
Maintainability is an important aspect of the system lifecycle to consider early as 
it will effect the quantitative and qualitative requirements (such as MTBF and 
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availability) as well as the manning and logistic supply requirements.  Table 14 
summarizes the elements of maintainability as they apply to the systems engineering 
lifecycle introduced by Blanchard and Fabrycky.  As with “UAV Lesson 2,” this method 
supports the importance of acquiring maintainability data throughout all stages of system 
development. 
 
Table 14. Summary of the role of maintainability in the systems engineering 
lifecycle (After: Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006) 
Stage Application of Maintainability 
Conceptual Design Maintenance concept, quantitative and qualitative 
maintainability requirements for system, 
maintainability planning. 
Preliminary Design Allocation of maintainability requirements, 
maintainability analysis and trade-offs, 
maintenance engineering analysis, design 
support, maintainability predictions, formal 
design review and approval. 
Detail Design and 
Development 
Maintainability analysis and trade-offs, 
maintenance engineering analysis, design 
support, maintainability predictions, 
maintainability demonstration, formal design 
review and approval. 
Production / 
Construction 
Maintainability test and evaluation; 





Maintainability data collection, analysis, and 
evaluation; system modification (as required). 
 
a. Organizational, Intermediate, and Depot Level Maintenance 
DoD systems operate with three levels of maintenance: organizational, 
intermediate, and depot, described in Figure 32.  A successful maintenance plan should 
incorporate all three levels of support.  The manning analysis discussed how the use of a 
dedicated cadre of operators supported the ability to perform organizational level 
maintenance.  The cadre will also support intermediate level maintenance, as it could be 
performed on board a support vessel, pier-side, or at the UUV detachment headquarters.   
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For UUVs, depot level maintenance will most likely be performed by the contractor only, 
easing some of the logistics support burden of the Navy when it comes to the most 
complex levels of repair. 
 
 
Figure 32. System operational and maintenance flow (From: Blanchard & Fabrycky, 
2006) 
 
The organizational, intermediate, and depot level concepts are then broken 
into specific criteria in Table 15. 
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Table 15. Criteria for organizational, intermediate, and depot levels of maintenance 
(From: Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006) 
 
 
b. Sample Organizational Level Maintenance Routines on UUVs 
An estimate for future maintenance routines for the Navy can be taken 
from current industry vehicles.  The HUGIN 1000 AUV is a smaller, militarized version 
of the previously discussed HUGIN 3000 that is part of a North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization MCM Group.  The HUGIN 1000 has operator level maintenance consisting 
of visual inspections and component flushing, and the amount of time dedicated to 
routine organizational level maintenance is shown in Table 16.  Short maintenance times 
on board a submarine are ideal as manning, space, and time are all limiting factors when 
compared to traditional industrial launch and recovery platforms.  Fortunately for 
comparison to future Navy UUVs, down time in industry means loss of revenue and 
therefore man-hour maintenance times have been optimized to short intervals. 
 
Table 16. Organizational level man-hour requirements for the HUGIN 1000 AUV 
(From: C. Hancock, personal communications, April 5, 2010) 
Maintenance Interval Man-hours 
Before each dive 2 men, 0.5 hours each 
After each dive 2 men, 1.0 hours each 
Every 50 hours of power-on time 2 men, 2.0 hours each 
Every 500 hours of power-on time, or 3rd month 2 men, 3.0 hours each 
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It is expected that military use of UUVs on board submarines will have a 
slightly different maintenance schedule, as the long term interval maintenance (50 hour 
and 500 hour) may be done at the intermediate level.  Pre- and post- deployment 
maintenance routines, however, should follow very closely to HUGIN 1000.  
Maintenance done at the user level will not only require basic skill sets, but limited space 
and supplies as well.  The space and supply limitation will be even more restricted on 
board a submarine.  The post mission degree of maintenance performed on a HUGIN 
1000 is on par with the type of maintenance that could be performed after UUV recovery 
on a submarine, as shown in Table 17.  The events shown in the table can be completed 
simultaneously, ultimately reducing the length of time spent on maintenance.  The 
simultaneous completion of the jobs, however, would require an increase in the manning 
necessary to complete the jobs.  The reliability data collected by the HUGIN 1000 AUV 
to determine the maintenance intervals was collected during all stages of the systems 
lifecycle, as suggested by “UAV Lesson 2.” 
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Table 17. Organizational level maintenance performed on the HUGIN 1000 AUV 
after each mission (From: C. Hancock, personal communications, April 5, 2010) 
No Sub-System Maintenance Routine Time  
1 Vehicle Hull − Clean and inspect 
− Inspect shells, vehicle units, and 
mechanical parts 
20 min 
2 Propulsion Motor − Inspect oil buffer 2 min 
3 Rudder Section − Inspect oil buffer for leakage 2 min 
4 Air Recovery Bladder − Inspect for damages 2 min 
5 Drop Weight − Inspect release mechanism 5 min 
6 Flashing Light − Clean exterior with fresh water 2 min 
7 Mission Start Key − Clean exterior with fresh water 2 min 
8 Control Container − Rinse container 4 min 
9 Battery System − Refill oil in buffer 10 min 
10 Payload Container − Rinse container 4 min 
11 Transponder for HiPAP − Rinse Container 2 min 
12 MST Transponder − Rinse Container 2 min 
13 Transducers and Containers − Perform insulation test 10 min 
14 Recovery System − Flush with fresh water 
− Test release and reset alarm 
− Check and grease the o-rings 
− Inspect for leakage 
10 min 
15 Recovery Bladder − Inspect for leakage and visible 
damage 
5 min 
16 Drop Weight − Flush the drop weight mechanism 2 min 
  Total maintenance time: 84 min 
 
c. Future Maintenance Ideas for Large-Scale UUVs 
One problem with the Navy’s 2004 UUV Master Plan definition of a 
Large Vehicle is that it places all UUVs with a diameter greater than 21 inches into a 
generic category (Department of the Navy, 2004).  Some UUVs, larger than 21 inches, 
like the Sea Stalker at 38 inches, have the ability to be housed in a DDS on board a SSN 
or SSGN, while other UUVS, like the Sea Maverick at 48 inches, do not have the ability 
to be accommodated in a DDS.  Additionally, when even larger UUVs are militarized, in 
some cases up to 80 inches, they still fit in the generic Large Vehicle class.  This poses a 
problem for the current UUV operators and maintainers as they are given vehicles with a 
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high variance in capabilities that must be treated in the same fashion.  For the case of this 
discussion, an extra class “Very Large Vehicle” should be added to include vehicles that 
are larger than those that can be accommodated in a DDS. 
As the UUVs become larger, as is the case of the Very Large Vehicle, 
submarines cannot be used to perform organizational level maintenance.  Additionally, as 
the UUVs become more complex the personnel may not be properly trained in 
performing the maintenance activities or the supplies may not be available to the 
operators, therefore causing the submarine to be an inadequate location to perform the 
organizational level maintenance.  As a result, UUVs may need to incorporate some type 
of support vessel to couple with to perform routine preventative and corrective 
maintenance.  With the small amount of submarine tenders in the Navy, UUV 
maintenance cannot be imposed on the crews of the USS Emory S. Land (AS-39) or USS 
Frank Cable (AS-40).  The more likely answer to which vessel to use is LCS, due to 
various features of the vessel that lend to UUV support, including: 
• Off-board vehicle launch and recovery system 
• Large mission bay 
• Mission bay lift 
• Mission module packages 
Contrary to some belief, the use of LCS for UUV launch, recovery, and 
logistic support does not remove the need for a submarine to be involved in the loop.  The 
submarine aspect of LCS-submarine tandem can be used for covert launch of the UUV 
(later to be recovered by LCS), undersea communications, and mission updates.  A 
sample CONOPS involving a SSN and LCS is covered in the next section. 
d. Power Concerns and Options 
One of the greatest concerns of the Navy with UUVs is power.  Currently, 
batteries are the source of power and will be until a better method can be developed for 
undersea use.  A complication in 2008 with the Advanced SEAL Delivery System 
catching fire during a lithium ion battery charge has added additional constraints on the 
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types of batteries approved.  The Navy has not authorized the use of lithium battery 
technology onboard a SSN, which include systems housed in the DDS.  Most UUVs 
operated by industry, however, are successfully using lithium battery technology as their 
power source and are noticing endurances that are up to an order of magnitude longer 
than that of alkaline batteries. 
The type of power source chosen for the future deployable UUVs will 
have a drastic impact on the level of maintenance necessary at the organizational level.  
Currently, the average UUV concept considers a rechargeable battery (lithium or other) 
for a power source, but this should not be the only form chosen.  Even if the requirements 
focus on the use of batteries as a constraint, it is important to do a trade-off between 
primary (single-use) and rechargeable batteries.  Although the use of primary battery 
technology will generally require a battery replacement at the intermediate or depot level 
after each use, versus a simple recharge at the organizational level, some primary battery 
UUVs have shown an endurance of nearly three times that of their rechargeable 
counterparts of the same weight and volume (J. Bellingham, personal communications, 
April 29, 2010).  The added capability of the tripled endurance may be an acceptable 
trade-off, especially when dealing with UUVs that are attached to submarines that have 
limited deployment lengths.  As discussed with “UAV Lesson 6,” the longer the 
endurance, the greater the MTBM, and the less manning and logistics support necessary 
to support the program.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This section discussed the systems engineering process and went into detail on 
two parts of the systems engineering lifecycle, manning and maintainability, as they 
apply to a future UUV program.  It is important that stakeholders fully understand the 
systems engineering process if they want to make a successful submarine UUV program, 
similar to those discussed in the next chapter. 
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VI. SAMPLE CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To move forward in the development process, it needs to be understood that there 
is not one “cookie cutter” CONOPS that can apply to all submarine UUV programs.  This 
section includes two different CONOPS that employ technologies that are reasonably 
mature today.  The Navy should analyze these suggestions as possible programs of 
record.  These CONOPS will focus mainly on the impact the programs will have on the 
manning and maintainability aspects of the submarine force.  These CONOPS are limited 
in scope to discuss the items presented in the beginning of the chapter and were created 
using a combination of published Navy ideas, literature research, and personal interviews.  
They are not intended to consider all aspects of the UUVs operations.  Both of the 
CONOPS are set in the near future (less than 10 years) and assume only little 
technological advances have been made to overcome some of the barriers in place today.  
Lastly, the two CONOPS can be completed without changing the current deployment 
schedules of the submarines, as the missions being completed are similar to time and 
scope to current submarine missions. 
B. GROUP OF SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED UUVS 
1. Operational Situation 
While operating near enemy waters, the latest Virginia-class SSN is equipped 
with six 21-inch UUVs, similar in size and functionality to the ASM-X (see Chapter II).  
The crew of the Virginia class submarine has been given orders to gather short-range, 
encrypted communication data near the coast of an unfriendly nation.  This data is 
essential to the mission of a CSG operating in the region and therefore must be captured 
in near real-time, decrypted, and relayed from the SSN to the CSG commander. The 
littoral nature of the coastline near the nation has made the area inaccessible to the 
submarine. 
It is the decision of the commanding officer to utilize four of his available UUVs 
and begins to deploy them toward the AOI.  Each UUV is programmed with critical 
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mission data and sequentially shot from one predetermined torpedo tube.  Each UUV will 
navigate along a programmed path to a specified point of interest, all while autonomously 
avoiding previously unidentified obstacles that may get in its way.  The first UUV will 
arrive near the communications tower and the other three UUVs will set up as 
communication nodes between the first UUV and the Virginia-class submarine, as shown 
in Figure 33.  The data will be decrypted and analyzed in near real-time on board the SSN 
by intelligence personnel and then relayed to the CSG commander. After the 
commanding officer has determined that no more data will need to be collected, an order 
is sent to the four deployed UUVs via ACOMMS (unless a better form of technology can 
be proven) and they return to rendezvous with the SSN. 
 
 
Figure 33. High level graphical depiction of operational situation for a group of 




The preference of the Navy is a fully mission configurable UUV with modular 
payloads.  This concept will provide both cost savings and mission flexibility in the long 
term, but is not something that will be successful for a UUV of the near future.  Instead, a 
clearly defined mission, as shown above, will lead to specific UUV designs that will be in 
place on submarines. To complete a vital ISR mission, the systems will be outfitted with 
a retractable antenna that is extended to collect the encrypted, short-range 
communications when the vessel breaches the surface, similar to the antennas used in the 
Sea Stalker UUV. 
The torpedo room on board a Virginia-class submarine was not initially designed 
to launch or recover UUVs and some adjustments have been made in order to support the 
new systems.  Originally equipped to carry 26 tube-launched weapons, the addition of the 
UUVs reduce the weapon load to 18 (6 spaces filled by UUVs and 2 by support 
equipment).  Unlike the LMRS program, the UUVs have been designed to be launched 
and recovered in the same tube, allowing for weapons loading in 3 of the 4 available 
tubes.  Because the use of UUVs decreases the original capability of the weapon systems 
and is thought of as an extreme detriment by some of the war-fighters, only one Virginia-
class submarine is outfitted with torpedo tube launched UUVs. 
The short-term cost savings will be implemented by varying the types of systems 
that will be loaded on board the Virginia-class submarine.  As an example, only two of 
the six UUVs will be outfitted with the retractable antenna system and the other four will 
only act as communication nodes, not gather the ISR data.  The communication amongst 
the UUV nodes and eventually to the SSN is done using ACOMMS (or other) technology 
with which all six UUVs is equipped.  The supply of six UUVs would be able to perform 
a maximum of four missions – two missions per UUV group and only two ISR gathering 
UUVs.  The amount of communication node UUVs would depend on the specific 
operational situation. 
A challenge faced by the utilization of the forward end of a Virginia-class 
submarine to house UUVs is the lack of electrical-power distribution systems needed to 
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recharge the system’s batteries (Button, Kamp, Curtin, & Dryden, 2009).    Taking this 
and endurance into consideration, the UUVs discussed in this scenario are designed with 
primary batteries.  Although the application of single-use batteries will limit the UUVs to 
only one or two missions per deployment, it has several advantages, including: 
• More endurance.  Primary batteries have up to three times the endurance 
of secondary batteries.  This means that a UUV designed to operate for 
only one mission can spend more time on station and carry out more tasks 
than its rechargeable equivalent. 
• Less supportability.  There is no need for complex electrical-power 
distribution systems on board the SSN to recharge the batteries.  
Additionally, there will be a need for fewer spare parts that will have to be 
stored in the torpedo room. 
• Less operational level maintenance.  Systems will not need the operator 
to charge the system, monitor the battery, or perform any upkeep on the 
battery that would typically be done with a rechargeable system.  Because 
the systems will need to be brought back to an intermediate level facility 
for battery replacement, there will be little to no operator maintenance 
performed after the battery has been depleted. 
Due to restrictions on board submarines, the primary batteries used will not take 
advantage of lithium technology.  This restriction will limit the average useful mission 
length to 12-18 hours, a range of 12-15 nautical miles, and a top speed less than 5 knots.  
Though this is far shorter than the 30-day ISR mission desired by the Navy, there are 
several missions (similar to the one described above) that will benefit from a short range 
UUV.  Additionally, the ability to launch and recover from a submerged SSN will shorten 
the needed ferry range and allow for more time on target.    
The technologies available and mission specifics may drive the communication 
range between the UUV nodes.  To ensure successful communication amongst UUVs, it 
may be necessary to use additional leave behind (or recoverable) communication nodes, 
similar to those described in the Seaweb concept (Rice, 2005) and shown in Figure 11. 
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3. Maintenance 
As mentioned earlier, very little organizational level maintenance will need to be 
performed on the systems.  After each deployment, the systems will need to be cleaned to 
ensure that they do not deteriorate prior to the intermediate or depot level maintenance 
phase.  Additionally, if the UUVs are used on a second mission, a maintenance routine 
similar (minus the battery upkeep) to that of the HUGIN 1000 vessel (shown in Table 17) 
will need to be completed.  The remainder of the maintenance executed will be on the 
support systems.  A majority of the focus will be on the launch/recovery system and 
communication.  
Even though the payloads are considered simple, the use of the UUVs for a 
maximum of two deployments will allow the maintenance routines to be more complex 
and require less time, thus allowing for proven systems with a lower operational 
availability (Ao), as described in the equation below, in relation with MTBM and mean 
down time (MDT).  A lower Ao is generally considered to be a deterrent in the decision 
making process.  In this case, however, the higher MDT does not negatively affect the 
mission and would lower the support costs of the system.  This tradeoff could be the 





Sailors aboard the Virginia-class submarine will not be properly trained to operate 
and perform the maintenance necessary, requiring the use of a cadre of personnel to assist 
the crew.  This cadre, most likely from the DEVRON 5 UUV Detachment, would consist 
of a supervisor and up to four sailors.  The supervisor would be at a minimum rank of 
Chief (E-7), but could be a Warrant Officer or junior (O-3 or below) LDO.  The 
sophisticated nature of the launch/recovery system and the communications would most 
likely require the use of contractors to aid in the organizational level maintenance.  In this 
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case, two contractors may be necessary (one for each system), but they would be able to 
replace the members of the detachment.  As the detachment becomes more proficient 
with using the equipment, these contractors can be replaced by detachment personnel.  A 
summary of the crew necessary to support this mission is shown in Table 18.  Lastly, the 
nature of the ISR missions performed by the UUVs may also require specific intelligence 
personnel to augment the crew.  This is currently a typical practice on board submarines 
and is not shown in the summary table.   
 







− In charge of UUV detachment and interfaces with 
ship’s crew 
− Minimum rank of E-7 
− Stands watch and performs maintenance, as needed 
Operator / 
Maintainer (2) 
− Work in shifts while UUV is deployed 
− Perform organizational level maintenance 
− Rank of E-4 through E-6 
− Mixture of submarine qualified rates (ET, STS, FT, 
MM) 
Contractor (2) − Perform maintenance on support equipment 
− Long term goal would be to replace with detachment 
 
5. Recommendations 
In order to develop a successful UUV program, it will need to begin with a 
specific mission or set of missions.  A mission configurable, multi-mission, sophisticated 
UUV has great uses in the long-term future, but this should not be the short-term focus of 
a Navy program.  In the case of the group of small submarine-launched UUVs, a single 
mission (or small set of similar missions) should be the desired intent of the Navy.  An 
initial trade study may show that the amount of personnel necessary to support this type 
of mission is not worth the small benefit of a single mission, short endurance UUV 
program.  With time, the contractors will be replaced by detachment personnel, and the 
detachments will be replaced by ship’s force.  Eventual advances in technology will 
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allow for longer endurance and more sophistication.  Though the financial facts may look 
discouraging, a program similar to this is necessary to advance the UUV technology.  
To counteract the relatively high cost of manning, the UUVs used in the scenario 
discussed would be low cost, estimated between $300,000 and $500,000.  The low cost 
can be attributed to the fact that each system in the UUV group is less sophisticated than 
some of the proposed multi-mission UUVs that are in development.  This cost is further 
reduced by limiting the group to six UUVs, only two of which have ISR gathering masts.  
Though this cost would not be considered expendable, it is much cheaper than many of 
the current combat systems on board a submarine. 
There are a few possible variations to the scenario, and each would maintain a 
similar level of maintenance and cost.  First, instead of using torpedo tubes, the D5 
missile tubes on board SSGN and later Virginia-class submarines could be modified to 
support the launch and recovery of UUVs.  Second, if the ability to recover a UUV is not 
possible (via a torpedo tube or D5 missile tube) then the UUVs could be either 
abandoned and self-destructed or retrieved by a surface asset (such as LCS or a DDG).  
Lastly, to increase the amount of missions performed by the groups, the UUVs could be 
outfitted with payloads that drop leave-behind sensors and communication nodes, as 
opposed to staying on station locally. 
This scenario is only one of many possible missions, payloads, and CONOPS that 
can be supported by the 21-inch UUV.  The important fact in moving forward is for the 
Navy to focus on specific missions prior to the systems engineering of an official 
program. 
C. GROUP OF LARGE DIAMETER UUVS 
1. Operational Situation 
An operational commander has given a forward deployed LCS the order to 
dispatch a series of Large Diameter UUVs (LDUUVs) to perform a “Hold at Risk” ASW 
mission near an enemy submarine base.  Understanding the risk of detection, the LCS 
deploys two 48-inch LDUUVs similar in size to Sea Maverick UUV (see Chapter III).  
The UUVs are programmed to drive into the predetermined “Hold at Risk Zone” 
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maintaining a persistent, forward barrier, while monitoring the operating area.  Upon 
confirming the identity of an enemy contact, the LDUUV must establish contact with a 
mission commander in order to obtain mission tasking.  However, stealth requirements 
make it unfeasible for the LDUUV to communicate with the LCS, requiring the 
operational commander to deploy a Los Angeles-class submarine into the AOI. 
 
 
Figure 34. High level graphical depiction of operational situation for a group of 
LDUUVs 
 
The large size of the LCS mission bay area will allow the ship to easily carry six 
48-inch LDUUVs when configured for a Hold as Risk ASW scenario.  The number of 
LDUUVs will allow for the systems to be broken into four different phases: 
• In transit.  The distance of the LCS from the AOI will vary depending on 
the operational situation, but it will most likely require the LDUUV to  
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perform a long-range transit into the operating area.  The duration of the 
transit could require one system to always be in this phase.  This phase 
includes both launch and recovery. 
• On station.  The size of the port and demands of the mission will 
determine the number of systems on station.  Though the intent of the 
entire program would be to have LDUUVs on station, the other three 
phases will have an impact on the number of on station LDUUVs.  The 
amount of time on station would vary, but a realistic goal of the program 
should be to allow the LDUUV to remain in the AOI for a more than one 
day (2-5 days is feasible), anchoring as necessary to conserve resources. 
• Off-line.  Upon recovery, the system will be placed off-line for 
maintenance, charging, and mission reconfiguration (if necessary).  The 
amount of time in this phase will depend on the vessel status, mission, and 
type of batteries used.   
• Standby.  After the necessary maintenance and off-line phase, the systems 
will remain on standby until the mission requires their use.  Vehicles in 
this phase will remain transit ready for quick deployment.  
While in the “in transit” phase, the LDUUV will send and receive low bandwidth, 
mission specific data with the Los Angeles-class submarine operating outside of the 
“Hold at Risk Zone”.  This communication link will allow the commanding officer to 
determine which targets will be ignored, trailed, or handed off to other assets in the AOI.  
The long-term situation could utilize a strike/attack option (lethal and non-lethal), but in 
the short-term, the LDUUVs will only be utilized in a tracking or information gathering 
mission set. 
2. Payloads 
There are fewer restrictions on the type of energy source used in the LDUUVs 
because they will not be deployed from a submarine.  The absence of this restraint will 
allow the LDUUVs to be designed with state-of-the-art lithium battery technology and, as 
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a result, the LCS deployed vessels will have more endurance, faster speeds, and increased 
capability in comparison to the torpedo tube launched UUVs.  In an effort to increase the 
number of missions performed by the LDUUVs, the batteries used will most likely be 
rechargeable.  With this in mind, it is important to note that the UUVs could use primary 
batteries that are swapped out after each mission, though a thorough CBA may determine 
that this is not the best decision, unless a mission specifically requires the use of primary 
batteries. 
The LDUUVs will be more expensive than the submarine-launched systems.  The 
added cost will be in some of the advanced payloads that will be placed on the larger 
systems.  The payloads will include advanced forward and side scan sonar technologies, 
advanced identification and filtering software, and multiple different communication 
packages.  A full trade study must be performed to determine the exact systems the 
LDUUVs will use, but the Navy should recognize that this CONOPS, unlike the previous 
CONOPS, should prioritize advanced technologies and LCC over acquisition cost 
savings.  
3. Maintenance 
It is theoretically possible for a modified SSGN to launch and recover a 48-inch 
LDUUV, but the advent of the LCS provides several advantages that the submarine 
cannot.  The main benefit of using a support ship is the size of the mission bay (over 
15,000 square feet in the LCS-2), allowing for a large space to perform maintenance and 
store logistic support elements on board. 
 
 
Figure 35. Artist depiction of flexible mission bay in LCS-2 (From: Austal, 2007) 
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The LCS would perform both organizational and intermediate level maintenance, 
following a similar model to the HUGIN 1000 as summarized in Table 16.  To support 
long-term operations and flexible mission planning, the LCS mission bay will store 
several spare parts and multiple mission payloads (sensors, communication equipment, 
etc.). 
Unlike the submarine-launched model, Ao is an important aspect of the LDUUV 
program.  The maintenance performed on board the vessel must be done in a timely 
manner, increasing the amount of time the vessel can be performing the necessary 
mission.  It is unrealistic and not cost beneficial to have an extremely large Ao.  Similar to 
the LMRS program, a desired Ao should be set between 0.88 – 0.92. 
The use of rechargeable batteries will play the most significant role in increasing 
the MDT and decreasing the operational availability.  Focusing on the use of secondary 
batteries, further research should be conducted to determine if it is possible to use 
batteries that are replaceable, allowing them to charge while the UUV is conducting 
mission operations.  The use of these would be solely dependent on the tradeoff between 
charging and battery replacement time.  Initial discussions with experts show that battery 
swapping may be more expensive and time consuming than expected, but still offers 
some room for increased availability.  
The system reliability must be at the forefront of system requirements.  Reliability 
is driven by the number of failures, and a program that is completing sensitive missions 
in unfriendly waters cannot run the risk of having high failure modes.  The two design 
factors than can increase reliability are robust component design and redundancy.  Both 
are not cost effective, but are necessary in maintaining the standards the Navy will need 
for a successful program.  For some cost savings, a full analysis, similar to “UAV Lesson 
7,” should be performed to ensure the systems are not over designed.  If the data is 




The use of a LCS and SSN will require both vessels to have manning to support 
the ASW mission.  Similar to the other CONOP, the manning estimates do not take into 
account any intelligence personnel that may be required to complete the specific 
missions. 
The demand registered by the LCS will require as many as ten Navy detachment 
and contractors to perform maintenance and launch and recovery supervision.  The nature 
of the missions will require personnel to be available around-the-clock in support of the 
efforts.  This number will be higher if ship’s force is unable to assist in the launch and 
recovery of the LDUUVs.  
Though the submarine will not be performing launch and recovery or 
maintenance, the onboard manning requirement would still be comparable to the torpedo 
tube launched CONOPS.  The long endurance capability of each LDUUV coupled with 
the cycling of systems on station could lead to an around the clock watch station for 
greater than 30 days.  This leads to a minimum of one supervisor and three other 
detachment-based personnel to operate the communications equipment and direct 
mission-tasking between the UUV and submarine.  Unlike the previous CONOPS, with 
minimal training the mission could be completed by ship’s force and require only one 
detachment based supervisor during each deployment.  Lastly, a contractor or two may be 
necessary (but not required) to support maintenance on the communication system or 
mission console.   
5. Recommendations 
The LDUUV program provides different opportunities than the submarine-
launched 21-inch UUV, but with it comes various challenges.  Naval leadership would 
prefer to have up to 30 days of persistent, sustained UUV operations, but this goal is not 
realistic in the short term.  Instead, the use of a group of vehicles that cycle between 
maintenance (off-line and standby) and operation (in transit and on station) phases will 
allow for the mission sets of a long endurance UUV without the technical challenges. 
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The only realistic, short-term way to service the LDUUVs is through a support 
ship operation.  Due to the nature of the forward deployed missions, the support ship 
cannot be a research vessel, but must be a warship.  With that, LCS is not the only 
platform possible but it does provide some important benefits in comparison to the 
alternatives, including the modular mission support and large mission bay.  It is important 
that Navy not only start developing a submarine UUV program that uses the LCS as a 
valuable resource for operational supportability but also to focus on it at the beginning 
stages of program development. 
ISR is the leading mission candidate for the first submarine program of record.  
Though this CONOPS focused on an ASW mission, the principles can be applied to 
many of the missions outlined in the 2004 Navy UUV Master Plan (Department of the 
Navy, 2004).  Unlike the smaller UUVs which are low cost, short of physical space on 
board, and lack logistic supportability, the LDUUV can be designed to be more mission 
reconfigurable, with interchangeable payloads and sensors.  Even with this ability, the 
Navy should still keep their short-term focus on a single (or closely related) mission(s) 
requiring the fewest number of design configurations and logistical support pieces. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce two specific CONOPS that the Navy 
can consider for two successful submarine UUV programs.  Time, resource, scope, and 
classification constraints of this thesis have limited the amount of details in these 
CONOPS, but the big picture ideas discussed should be brought to the forefront of UUV 
decision making, starting with the mission definition in the systems engineering process.  
With that, the important take away from this chapter is the specifically defined missions 
of the UUVs, increasing the odds of a successful DoD program. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis used government and industry resources to focus on the systems 
engineering fundamentals that are necessary to have a successful submarine UUV 
program of record.  To do this, systems and missions needed to be researched and 
discussed to ensure that both the author and reader have similar understandings to the 
scope of the research.  Additionally, these sections have attempted to break down the 
“stove-piped” research currently taking place in the areas of commercial and militarized 
UUVs.  A majority of the discussion outside of the systems engineering discussion and 
sample CONOPS (Chapters V and VI) is well understood by the industry’s and Navy’s 
top UUV experts, but it is information that is not known, understood, or otherwise 
available to some of the decision makers that are directly responsible for the success (or 
failure) of current and future programs. 
The systems engineering discussion and CONOPS portion of this thesis combine 
the ideas that are presented in Chapters II-IV to propose actions and procedures that are 
lacking in the current development of a submarine UUV program.  This section will 
summarize those conclusions and recommendations, and furthermore, will offer the Navy 
decision makers some ideas in regards to what needs to be done to create a near-term, 
formal, and successful program of record. 
This section summarizes the answers to the research questions posed in the 
introduction.  The five questions answered by this thesis are: 
1. Which UUV missions are most likely to occur in the near future?  Are 
these missions feasible for the Navy? 
2. Which of the UUV missions are most applicable to support the submarine 
force?  Will these missions require deployment/retrieval from a submarine 
platform? 
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3. Have unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) provided any lessons learned during their employment in military 
operations?  
4. Will UUVs have a detachment to support their use, or will they utilize 
ship’s force?  Will the operators be contractors or military?  If military, 
which ratings will be used to operate these systems?  Will additional 
ratings be necessary to accommodate the mission sets?  What training is 
necessary for the operators? 
5. What changes in the current infrastructure for maintenance and system 
support are necessary to complete the missions of both the UUVs and 
submarines?  Can the maintenance be done on board (operator level), or 
will other vessels and facilities be required?  Does the use of UUVs 
change the original schedule of the host submarine? 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The government is devoting much effort in the formal training and proper 
utilization of Systems Engineers.  As a result, many programs are seeing an increase in 
their productivity during the early stages of lifecycle development.  Unfortunately, many 
programs are being researched and tested using informal processes through government 
organizations like ONR and DARPA and are ultimately cancelled due to funding 
concerns.  Though there is a place for research and development of technologies, the 
current procedures are sidelining UUV programs that have performed up to, and in some 
cases beyond, operator’s expectations.  Many programs in development are outside the 
needs of preliminary development and must be pursued in the form of a formal program.  
To ensure a successful DoD program, the systems will need to be developed using a 
formal systems engineering process.  Adhering to these processes will ensure that a 
successful program will retain funding. 
To do this, the Navy must start with a clearly defined mission and then follow 
four basic steps to develop the ideas into systems.  These steps, in order, are: develop 
requirements, determine tasks, create functions, and design components.  This will 
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require the government to produce ideas independent of the end product in mind.  This 
means that the decision makers will have to change the desire of a “30 day submarine 
launched UUV” to that of “covert UUV systems capable of sustaining a 30 day ISR 
mission.”  In most cases, these two sentences may appear to be the same from the point 
of view of the decision makers, but will yield completely different desires and outcomes 
at the developmental levels.  The first requires technologies that are unproven, expensive, 
and long term; the second can be completed in the near future with systems currently 
under development. 
The intent of the thesis was to analyze the impact of a submarine UUV program 
on the manning and maintenance of the submarine force.  Outside of the systems 
engineering and development process concerns discussed previously, this thesis comes to 
three conclusions: focus the missions, learn lessons from UGVs and UAVs, and consider 
manning and maintainability.   
1. Focus the Missions 
The 2004 UUV Master Plan outlines nine distinct Navy missions that can be 
accomplished by UUVs (Department of the Navy, 2004).  Though these missions were 
listed in “priority” order, they do not take into account near term feasibility or 
applicability for use by the submarine force.  As a result, this thesis focused on only two 
of the nine missions for those that are applicable for a submarine UUV program of the 
near future: ISR and ASW.  Additionally, a third mission, communications (a derivation 
of the Navy sub-pillar of CN3) must be accomplished to ensure success of any submarine 
UUV program.  These two (or three) missions are most easily accomplished with the 
current technologies used by industry and government resources. 
The challenges (other than budgetary considerations) that face current ISR and 
ASW missions are longevity and launch/recovery.  The research suggested ways of 
creating programs that will gain successful mission results in the near term while still 
adhering to the technical constraints faced by UUV developers. 
The Navy would prefer a long endurance vehicle (30 days or more), which is not 
feasible in the short-term, but this can be countered by the use of multiple UUVs rotating 
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in and out of the AOI, completing the same mission as a single long endurance vessel.  
This idea comes with risks, but it is a feasible option to research and evaluate.   
Additionally, there are proven launch/recovery assets possessed by foreign governments 
and past Navy programs.  In the short term, however, the most viable option, without 
significant changes to current submarines, is either a launch without recovery option 
(where the recovery could be done with the use of a support ship) or a support ship 
launch and recovery. 
2. Learn Lessons From UGVs and UAVs 
UGVs and UAVs provide several similarities to UUVs and were the basis for 
eleven lessons learned pertaining to the development of UUV systems.  The eleven 
lessons were diverse in their relation to UUVs, but all provided ideas that should be 
considered during the front-end system development process that directly relate to the 
manning and maintainability of a program of record.  These lessons (along with any 
others shared amongst the program offices) should all be considered prior to spending 
more money on testing, developing, and fielding new unmanned systems. 
3. Consider Manning and Maintainability 
The original intent of the research was to understand the manning and 
maintenance models and concerns that UUVs would have on the submarine force.   Past 
systems have neglected the impact of logistics on the deployment of new systems, and it 
is important that the developers of a submarine UUV program do not forget this.  The 
limited size, space, and crew aboard a SSN will require these thoughts to be fully 
considered before the program enters the advanced development stages. 
a. Manning Models and Ratings 
Unmanned systems have not had simple transitions into the military.  
During the transitions, personnel are trained to be both the equipment operators and 
maintenance experts.  This practice has been no different in the UUV community.  This 
gives the Navy two options: (a) train a large number of submarine qualified enlisted, 
Warrant Officer, and LDO ranks to operate and maintain the equipment, thus manning 
 99
each boat with qualified personnel, or (b) use a detachment of trained cadre experts to act 
as temporary resources aboard the vessels utilizing the complex UUV equipment.  In the 
long term, when each submarine is equipped with multiple UUV systems performing a 
variety of missions, the Navy will need to have some number of trained sailors serving as 
ship’s force on all deployed submarines.  In the short term, it is more realistic to continue 
the use of UUV detachments to support the programs as they are deployed on a small 
number of submarines.  
Depending on the mission and operational model used, the detachment 
size will vary.  According to various experts, the minimum manning for a submarine 
launched UUV program would be directly correlated to the number of UUV systems 
operated and maintained on board the submarine.  In each case, the manning model 
would utilize one supervisor, plus: 
• 2 personnel for 1 UUV 
• 3 personnel for 2-3 UUVs 
• 4 personnel for 4-6 UUVs 
This model, as utilized in Chapter VI, does take into account contractors 
for maintenance, but ignores the addition of intelligence personnel necessary to support 
the missions.  Experts estimate that the model for the LDUUV example would require 4-
5 personnel on board the submarine (no contractors necessary) and a complement of 10 
on board the support vessel (including contractors).  This increase in manning would 
support the longer, more maintenance-intense missions of the larger UUVs. 
The operator ratings vary in the UUV community, but are currently 
limited to submarine qualified ET, FT, MM, and ST.  The Navy has considered the idea 
of creating unmanned systems ratings for both the UAV and UUV communities, but this 
step is considered unnecessary and is discouraged by those in the submarine related UUV 
community.  Currently, the diverse experience and required submarine warfare 
qualification of a current UUV operator (under NEC 9550) is valued more than a specific 
rating.  Additionally, there is not short-term need for very junior (E-4 and below) and 
senior (E-9) personnel to demand a rating change. 
 100
b. Maintenance and Logistic Support 
DoD systems are serviced at three different levels of maintenance: 
organizational, intermediate, and depot.  Submarines do not provide the space needed to 
provide extensive maintenance of UUVs, making it difficult to perform the organizational 
level routines common to unmanned systems.  Two maintenance models can be used to 
support the organizational level maintenance for a submarine UUV program: 
• Limit Duty Cycles.  The lack of maintenance performed by the 
operators aboard submarines will limit the duty cycles that an 
individual system can perform during each submarine deployment.  
This option increases the intermediate level maintenance burden, 
but provides the ability to perform a submarine-only launch and 
recovery of UUVs. 
• Utilize a Support Ship.  Support ships, such as the LCS, provide 
large areas to perform both organizational and intermediate level 
maintenance.  These options will increase the number of times a 
UUV can be utilized during a deployment, but reduces the stealth 
nature of the operations and may limit the number of missions that 
the support ship can assist and perform.  This method should be the 
preferred choice for larger UUVs. 
The systems developed should not be “platform centric,” allowing them to 
be used with multiple launch and recovery systems (with little to no system 
modification).  Even with a modular approach, the systems must consider supportability 
during their design phases.  The power source, payload, and communications suites 
should not be designed without regard of the type of organizational (and intermediate) 
levels of maintenance to be performed. 
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
The intent of this thesis has been to focus on the abstract, high-level concepts that 
will affect the manning and maintainability aspects of the systems engineering process.  
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As a result, the scope of this thesis has led to several areas of further research for future 
studies.  The future work to expand this thesis into real world applications should be done 
in the areas of trade studies, technologies, lessons learned, and requirements. 
1. Perform Trade Studies 
In an effort to field UUVs in the near future, several trade studies will need to be 
performed using current levels of technologies.  Many of the current projects being 
developed for submarine use attempt to combine an abundance of “top of the line” 
features that are proving to be infeasible for successful development in the short term.  
Trade studies that should be performed that may directly lead to the success of a short-
term program and/or reduce LCC are to optimize MTBM, perform manning studies, 
maximize mission time, and enhance communications. 
a. Optimize MTBM 
An increase in the MTBM will reduce the maintenance and logistics cost 
but will increase the upfront acquisition costs.  A trade study will need to be performed 
on various maintenance metrics (mainly MTBM, but should also apply to MDT, 
reliability, and number of redundant components) and compare the cost of implementing 
the proposed changes and the effect that it will have on LCC.  Another area that could be 
involved in this study would be the number of duty cycles performed by each system. 
b. Perform Manning Studies 
A majority of the manning conclusions developed in this thesis came from 
the opinions of experts who are currently working on the development of UUVs and 
submarine UUVs.  Though their opinions are highly valuable and are credible for the 
basis of the discussion in this thesis, formal studies will need to be performed to 
understand the trade-off between personnel and LCC.  The two major questions that will 
need to be answered are 1) how many systems can one operator manage simultaneously 




intermediate levels of maintenance required at sea?  The answers to these questions will 
then need to take into account the specific ratings of the operators as well as whether they 
must (or can) be detachment based personnel. 
c. Maximize Mission Time, Not Endurance 
A reoccurring theme in this thesis and the unmanned vehicle world has to 
do with endurance.  This study has suggested that the desire for long endurance missions 
may be an unsubstantiated one and multiple platforms rotating in and out of the AOI may 
give the same result as one platform staying on station for a long period of time.  This 
theory will need further analysis to determine the impact several systems have on the 
overall cohesiveness of the mission.  Ultimately, the goal of the programs should be to 
maximize the mission time.  Ideally this would be done with a high endurance vehicle, 
but there are other options (especially in the short term) to consider without the costly 
technical challenges of maximizing endurance. 
d. Enhance Communications and Node Concepts 
Undersea communications (for this thesis mainly ACOMMS is presented) 
are limiting in range and bandwidth.  The stated CONOPS would need to be analyzed to 
determine if ACOMMS (or other) undersea communications are able to send the desired 
mission data between UUV nodes, or if these platforms will need to surface and use air as 
the medium for communication.  In this case, the quality of the signal would need to be 
balanced with the risk of using surfaced vessels and over the air signals.  Additionally, 
the feasibility of leave behind nodes will need to be further analyzed. 
2. Develop and Advance Technologies 
The area that is currently getting the most focus is the development of new 
technologies and advancement of current technologies.  The trade studies should be used 
to determine the best solution using existing technologies, but this does not mean to say 
we should ignore the many areas of growing technology that currently support UUV 
missions.  In both cases of current and future technologies, research should be focused on 
the maturation and militarization of the technologies over the theoretical and commercial 
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nature of the technologies as done by the industry today.  It is important that the 
stakeholders and developers understand the difference (if there is one) between the 
commercial and military standards of the technologies that are being developed.  
The three technical areas that need the most research to ensure the success of a 
submarine UUV program are: power (battery, fuel cell, or other), communications (above 
and below the surface), and launch/recovery.  These areas have been the focus extensive 
research efforts, but not specifically in the realm of militarization and submarine-based 
programs. 
3. Summarize Lessons Learned 
UUV programs can find valuable lessons learned from both UUV programs of the 
past and other unmanned programs.  Both of these can be derived and analyzed in 
different ways and can provide valuable insight into increasing the chance of success of a 
UUV submarine program of the future.  The data shared amongst the programs (UUV to 
UUV and UGV/UAV to UUV) should consist of both operational and technical data. 
a. Lessons From Other UUV Programs 
As discussed earlier, the ADO has been implemented as a means of 
sharing data amongst the unmanned systems programs of the Navy.  Though this thesis 
used past and current programs/projects to develop ideas for future CONOPS, it did not 
specifically list and describe lessons that can be learned from the successful and, perhaps 
more importantly, the unsuccessful programs.  Though the program offices (in this case 
the ADO) know some of the key lessons they have learned, a formal list would be 
extremely beneficial to all programs of the future.   
b. Lessons From UGVs and UAVs 
Chapter IV focused on the lessons that can be taken from UGVs and 
UAVs and implement in the UUV community.  This section has the ability to be 




correlation of these lessons.  For example, Table 8 and Table 9 discuss the various UGV 
vehicle classes and how they relate to human operators and similar tables could be 
researched and created for UUV platforms. 
Additional studies could focus on the relationship between water-space 
and air-space management data, the use of a single operator to control multiple platforms, 
maintenance routines, and non-lethal (and eventually lethal) engagement sequences. 
4. Concentrate on Requirements 
The case studies analyzed in this thesis discussed the importance of requirements, 
but did not use actual USN requirements during the development of the CONOPS.  Most 
of the programs of the past and present have had formal requirements documents.  A 
future study should utilize these documents and correspondence with the program offices, 
DARPA, and DEVRON 5 UUV Detachment personnel to determine a basic set of 
necessary requirements for a future UUV program.  These requirements should be set 
independent of the vehicles, platforms, and technologies currently being explored as 
UUV “projects.” 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a summary for the thesis.  It expanded upon concepts that 
were introduced and discussed during the body of the thesis and brought them together 
for a succinct summary of the author’s opinions on how the Navy should implement a 
submarine UUV program in the near future.  The Navy must develop formal CONOPS 
for the missions and systems that it wants to produce and allow industry to begin 
development for a formal future UUV program.  Furthermore, analysis suggests that the 
Navy should continue to support the use of a submarine detachment for operation and 
maintainability of future vehicle programs.   
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